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INTRODUCTION
Panacea: Rule 11 helps everyone; it eliminates the "pure heart, empty
head" excuse for sloppy lawyering. Pandora's Box: Rule 11 intensifies
in-fighting and spawns litigation; it is a "major threat" especially to
individual litigants and small law firms. How might state courts con-
cerned about wasteful litigation address these colliding views of Rule
11? Let's begin with two stories.
Story #1. Imagine a clear day. A well-traveled private road. An adult
male driving his jeep. 5:00 p.m. Sun setting outside of driver's line of
vision. He drives over an ordinary speed bump at fifteen miles an
hour and, he asserts, sustains serious injuries. His grandmother pas-
senger is uninjured. The speed bump is in plain view. He had
previously driven over that same speed bump at least eighty times.
Several years earlier the driver had received a $25,000 settlement
arising out of an unrelated auto incident.
Driver finds an attorney to file suit in 1989. Two-and-a-half page
bare-bones complaint. Ultimate claim for lost wages exceeds $70,000.
Negligent design, placement and maintenance of the speed bump.
Driver knew its location. He tells the attorney that the sun reflected
off a man-hole cover; he could not see the bump; a warning sign was
needed. Attorney conducts no independent investigation before filing.
Discovery commences. Interrogatories, document requests, plaintiff's
deposition. The case is dismissed for plaintiff's failure to timely file a
pretrial statement, then reinstated. Seventeen months after service,
defendant files its summary judgment motion. Eighteen page memo in
support, three exhibits, three affidavits. Defendant's expert engineer's
affidavit states that the manhole cover's shape and finish prevented
sunlight reflection. Defendant's expert meteorologist's affidavit states
that the sun set that day out of plaintiff's sight line.
The motions judge grants summary judgment. Plaintiff pays nothing
to its attorney. Defendant pays its attorneys full fare. No appeal.'
End of story.
Story #2. Imagine a breach of contract action. Critical issue-what
the parties' contemplated regarding defendant's performance obliga-
I This story is a hypothetical composite of various cases. It does not recount the
actual conduct of any particular parties.
University of Hawaii Law Review / Vol. 13:57
tions. Ambiguous written language. Conflicting oral statements. Part
way through discovery, defendant files a summary judgment motion
asserting plaintiff's lack of evidence on the issue of "intent." Three
page memorandum. Defendant proffers no specific evidence in support.
Clear loser. Plaintiff must nevertheless respond by producing, organ-
izing and arguing all evidence (including plaintiff's evidence not yet
discovered by defendant) in support of plaintiff's position, and couch
its arguments in the context of plaintiff's legal theories.2 Defendant's
summary judgment motion is denied. Inexpensive and potentially
valuable discovery for defendant. Considerable headache and expense
for plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel. Substantial court time.
End of story.
But no longer. The stories have an epilogue. Former Rule l1's
subjective bad faith standard for sanctioning "frivolous" filings has
been replaced with an objective reasonableness standard. In all likeli-
hood, the new standard, as interpreted by most federal courts, would
authorize sanctions against plaintiff's counsel, and possibly the plaintiff,
in our first story and sanctions against defendant's counsel in our
second story.
What about state courts such as Hawaii's that have recently adopted
the federal version of Rule 11?3 Would sanctions be appropriate?
Desirable? What are the immediate and long-term benefits and prob-
lems? What can be learned by state courts from federal court experience
with Rule 11?
Eight years have passed since the amendment of federal Rule 11.
Federal court experience with Rule II during those years has generated
considerable inquiry and commentary. The debate has sometimes been
heated. No definitive description of the impact of federal Rule 11 on
law practice has emerged. Available empirical data and inquiry into
values underlying Rule 11, however, point to general conclusions about
federal court experience that might guide state courts in the interpre-
tation and application of Rule 11.
Rule 11 in federal courts deters careless and ill-conceived filings to
a measurable extent.4 Rule 11 has made attorneys "stop, look and
2 See Munoz v. Yuen, 66 Haw. 603, 670 P.2d 825 (1983).
The Hawaii Supreme Court adopted the federal version of Rule 11, effective
September 1, 1990.
4 Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013, 1015 (1988) [hereinafter
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inquire" before filing.5 That is for the better. Fewer meritless positions
are asserted and litigated. Groundless motions and nuisance value
claims are discouraged. The system no longer need tolerate the baseless
summary judgment motion or the personal injury claim for the negli-
gent placement of an ordinary, visible speed bump over which plaintiff
had previously driven 80 times.
Federal Rule l's curb on "litigation abuse," however, has come
at an apparently steep price. Judges, attorneys, litigants and scholars
complain about excessive Rule 11 litigation, 6 about heightened adver-
sariness, about Rule 11 as a strategic weapon, about the inhibition of
creative lawyering and about diminished access to the courthouse for
"marginal" litigants.7 In particular, early empirical research suggests
a disproportionate impact upon small plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys.8
For example, an attorney in a small plaintiffs-oriented firm recently
faced six Rule 11 motions in litigating various employment discrimi-
nation cases in federal and state courts. The sanction requests were
filed by defense counsel from large firms as one paragraph tag-alongs
Schwarzer, Revisited] (Rule 11 "has certainly deterred some frivolous, wasteful or
abusive litigation"); accord Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts
for Minorities, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 341, 362 nn.100-02 (1990) [hereinafter
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat).
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 4, at 362.
6 Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 1118 F.R.D. 189, 199 (1988). Professor Vairo
notes that "[p]rior to 1983, there were only a handful of reported Rule 11 decisions.
Between August 1, 1983 and December 15, 1987, 688 Rule 11 decisions have been
reported, 496 district court opinions and 192 circuit court opinions." According to
Judge Schwarzer, aside from the reported decisions, "there are presumably many
more unreported rulings granting or denying sanctions under rule 11." Schwarzer,
Revisited, supra note 4, at 1013. Similarly, a search through LEXIS reveals that since
1989, 294 decisions dealing with Rule 11 have been handed down in the federal circuit
courts alone. (LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir files). See Section III(A), infra.
7 Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 4, at 365, 370 (quoting Judge Carter,
"Rule 11 has not been wielded neutrally and ... applications of the rule evince
'extraordinary substantive bias' against certain minority claims"). Another commen-
tator "argues that courts have applied amended rule 11 too broadly as a tool for
docket management and that they have thus, in many cases, undermined the value
of open access to court embodied in the liberal pleading regime of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure." Notes, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards For Rule 11 Sanctions,
100 HARV. L. REv. 630, 632 (1987). Similarly, Professor LaFrance states that "Rule
11 now represents a direct challenge to congressional policy, of nearly fifty years'
duration, that the courts should be open, not closed, to the public." LaFrance, Federal
Rule 11 And Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 331, 345 (1988).
' See infra text accompanying note 232-41.
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at the end of defendants' memos in opposition to motions filed by the
attorney. The attorney actually prevailed on some of the underlying
motions. All sanction requests against the attorney were denied. 9 All
drained resources from the attorney's firm. Most, to some extent,
placed the firm's survival at risk. The attorney characterized those
"routine" sanction requests as "major threats" against individual
litigants and small firms.10
Rule I 's identified problems in federal courts are traceable to several
sources. Three are particularly relevant to state courts. First, several
federal courts have established low thresholds for finding Rule 11
violations, thereby encouraging Rule 11 litigation;" second, disagree-
ments among the federal circuits about the construction and application
of the rule have inhibited the development of uniform standards about
technical aspects of the rule; 2 and third, conflicts about values of court
access have led to sharply divergent conceptions of the appropriate
impact of the rule upon "marginal" social and political groups and
attorneys likely to represent them. 3 For these reasons, Judge Schwarzer
commented that "i]n interpreting and applying rule 11, the federal
courts have become a veritable Tower of Babel.' '14
These problems have compelled some commentators to advocate
repealing the federal rule entirely. 15 Others strongly urge guidelines to
restrict Rule II's application.1 6 Still others perceive the rule's overall
9 The prematurely filed Rule 11 motions themselves would appear to be subject
to Rule 11 sanctions. See infa text accompanying notes 139-40.
10 Interview with attorney licensed to practice in the state of Hawaii, November
26, 1990.
" See generally Yamamoto, Efficieng's Threat, supra note 4, at 361 et seq. For a
discussion see infra Part 11I(A).
12 Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4, at 1013 (citing lack of predictability and the
excessive amount of litigation the rule generates as the two major problems associated
with Rule 11); accord Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REv.
485, 508 (1988) ("inconsistent application has fostered unpredictability, while lack of
predictability and the willingness of lawyers to employ rule 11 for strategic purposes
and to recoup attorney's fees have led to excessive litigation and corresponding delay
and waste").
Is See Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 4, at 345, 370; LaFrance, supra note
7, at 333; Tobias, supra note 12, at 487.
14 Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4, at 1015.
15 Tobias, supra note 12, at 524. See also LaFrance, supra note 7, at 354.
16 Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on
Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 385 (1990) [hereinafter Nelken, Chancellor]
(advocating amendment); Untereiner, A Uniforn Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE
L.J. 901 (1988) (suggesting possible guidelines).
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operation as salutary and encourage only minor tinkering.1" The Federal
Rules Advisory Committee itself has formally called for comments on
several Rule 11 issues, and amendments to amended federal Rule 11
may be in the offing.18
Is Rule 11 a pancea or pandora's box? And what does all this mean
for state courts adopting federal Rule 11? Simply put, how can state
courts draw upon federal court experience to realize the benefits and
minimize the problems of Rule 11? Federal and state courts differ in
many respects. Some federal court experiences will shed little light on
likely state court experience. Other federal court experiences, however,
address the heart of interpretive problems likely to be encountered by
state courts. One premise of this article is that state courts can learn
from but need not recreate federal court experience with Rule 11. This
article addresses potential state court experiences with Rule 11 by
focusing on the Hawaii state court system. The Hawaii court system
has a special opportunity to remake Rule 11 in its own image.' 9
7 See geveral/y Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4.
" Advisory Committee's Call for Comments on Rule 11 (July 24, 1990). The joint
comments submitted by section leaders of the Litigation Section of the American Bar
Association provide a flavor of the response to the call. Eighty percent of the section
leaders responding to a questionnaire indicated that the cost of Rule 11 proceedings,
both financial and professional, had exceeded its benefit. Around half favored amending
the rule. Thirty-seven percent favored outright repeal. Only ten percent favored
retaining the rule as is. 16 A.B.A. LITIO. NEws 4 (Feb. 1991).
19 There are only two reported Rule 11 cases from the Hawaii state courts, both
arising prior to the recent amendment to the rule. See Tobosa v. Owens, 69 Haw.
305 (1987), 741 P.2d 1280 (1987); Salud v. Financial Sec. Ins. Co., Ltd., 7 Haw.
App. 329, 763 P.2d 9 (1988). A third case, Coil v. McCarthy, No. 14105 (Haw. Jan.
11, 1991), decided by the Hawaii Supreme Court, cites new Rule 11 without discussion
and without employing it as the basis of decision.
The recent Rule 11 cases discussed in this article are from the several federal
circuits. Reported Hawaii cases emanating out of the Ninth Circuit include Maisonville
v. F2 Am., Inc., 902 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1990) (sanctions affirmed for a frivolous
motion for reconsideration); Peabody v. Maud Van Cortland Hill Schroll Trust, 892
F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3216 (1990) (sanctions affirmed for
filing a second removal petition); loyd v. Schlag, 884 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1989)
(sanctions affirmed against client for a good faith mistake of law and for premature
filing of an action); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 871 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1989)
(sanctions affirmed for a motion for summary judgment not well grounded in facts
and law); Soules v. Kauaians For Nukolii Campaign Committee, 849 F.2d 1176 (1988)
(sanctions against plaintiff reversed despite plaintiff's similar unsuccessful arguments
in opposition to developer's intervention in a similar prior state court action).
Reported Rule 11 cases from the United States District Court for the District of
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In 1987, Professor Yamamoto discussed the potential role of mana-
gerial judges in the Hawaii state court system. 20 Hawaii's court-annexed
arbitration program and other alternative dispute resolution programs
siphon away many of the smaller, less complicated cases formerly
handled by the circuit courts, leaving the courts with a greater pro-
portion of cases suited potentially to some type of qualitative judicial
management. Yamamoto viewed the federal version of Rule 11 poten-
tially as one aspect of civil judges' managerial powers.2 1
Rule 11 provides the managerial judge with the authority to control
"unreasonable" filings (pleadings and motions) through the application
of a tighter standard for sanctioning frivolous filings .... By design,
this modestly heightens attorney responsibility to conduct an initial
investigation, reduces stress on the court and litigants and minimizes
costly future fighting over meritless positions. Assuming a sensitive judicial
touch, this can be achieved without returning to the byzantine intricacies
of a code pleading system and without limiting access to the courts or
* . . inhibiting the assertion of novel yet plausible theories of law. 22
According to this view, Rule 11 may bear potential managerial
benefits for Hawaii's courts, provided that the rule is properly conceived
and sensitivity applied. In Part III of this article, we draw upon
approaches of the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal
and develop our view of a "proper conception" of Rule 11-that it is
most appropriately viewed as an extraordinary remedy to be cautiously
employed; that its operation is salutary if, but only if, the rule is
limited to deterring clearly in-conceived or improperly motivated fil-
Hawaii include National Consumer Coop. Bank v. Madden, 737 F. Supp. 1108 (D.
Haw. 1990); Wangler v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 742 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Haw. 1990); In
re Anthony Greco, 113 Bankr. 658 (D. Haw. 1990); GWC Restaurants, Inc. v.
Hawaiian Flour Mills, 691 F. Supp. 247 (D. Haw. 1988); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676
F. Supp. 1002 (1987); Lapin v. United States, 118 F.R.D. 632 (1987); All Hawaii
Tours v. Polynesian Cultural Center, 116 F.R.D. 645 (1987); Great Hawaiian Fin.
Corp. v. Aiu, 116 F.R.D. 612 (1987); Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585 (D. Haw.
1985).
The foregoing list of cases is based upon a LEXIS search and an examination of
additional sources. The list is not exhaustive.
20 Yamamoto, Case Management and the Hawaii Courts: 77Te Evolving Role of the
Managerial Judge in Civil Litigation, 9 U. HAw. L. REV. 395 (1987) (hereinafter,
Yamamoto, Case Management).
23 Id. at 455.
Id. at 405. (emphasis added).
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ings. 23 As the Ninth Circuit recently stated, sanctions should be "re-
serve[d] ... for the rare and exceptional case where an action is
clearly frivolous .. .or brought for an improper purpose." 24 Rule 11
is "not a panacea intended to remedy all manner of attorney miscon-
duct. ''25
Much has changed since Yamamoto's 1987 article, and more infor-
mation is available now. One goal of this article, therefore, is to update
and rethink technical aspects of Yamamoto's 1987 article. 26 Another
23 This conception of Rule 1 1 is one of several. It places high value on court access.
Reasonable arguments can be advanced for other conceptions that encourage more
frequent use of the rule. We endeavor to address those arguments throughout Sections
II and III.
Other state courts have generally embraced this limited conception of the sanctioning
process. California and Illinois state courts, for example, have experienced substantial
sanctioning litigation. Both court systems generally have adopted an "extraordinary
remedy" approach to sanctions in part to minimize sanctioning litigation and its
adverse effects.
California courts have interpreted California's statute authorizing sanctions for "bad
faith actions" or "frivolous tactics" to require a finding of bad faith in all instances.
Summers v. City of Cathedral City, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 275 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Cal.
App. 4 Dist. 1990). Frivolousness is thus equated to bad faith. The rationale for this
limiting approach is that: "(a) an action that is simply without merit is not by itself
sufficient to incur sanctions; (b) an action involving issues that are arguably correct,
but extremely unlikely to prevail should not incur sanctions; and (c) sanctions should
be used sparingly in the most egregious conduct situations." In re Marriage of Flaherty,
31 Cal. 3d 637, 650, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 646 P.2d 179 (1982). Even those decisions
defining frivolousness as something less than subjective bad faith recognize a high
threshold for sanctioning. See On v. Cow Hollow Properties, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1568,
272 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1990) (applying an objective test to determine
whether the filing was totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of
harassment).
The Illinois court system's sanctioning rule initially followed Federal Rule 11. It
was amended as Rule 137 in 1989 to soften its harsh effects. The amendment made
the imposition of sanctions discretionary upon a finding of a violation of the reason-
ableness standard-the federal rule mandates sanctions. In addition, the Illinois courts
have imposed procedural safeguards to prevent strategic misue of the sanctioning rule.
S&e Geneva Hosp. Supply, Inc. v. Sanberg, 172 Ill. App. 3d 960, 527 N.E.2d 611
(1988) (requiring the party seeking sanctions to support its motion with specific facts
and argument). As a practical matter, Illinois courts have employed Rule 137 and its
predecessor sparingly. Timberlake & Plonk, Attorney Sanctions in Illinois Under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 137, 20 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 1027, 1048 (1989). We thank Norman
Kato for his research on these issues.
24 Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1988).
25 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986).
The 1987 article's generally salutary although somewhat cautious tone is trans-
University of Hawaii Law Review / Vol. 13:57
goal is to offer a conception of Rule 11 for the state courts that
addresses salient criticisms of federal Rule 11.
Part I provides a brief history and discusses the purposes of federal
Rule 11. Part II attempts to clarify selected Rule 1 1 technical issues,
to reconcile conflicting federal circuit court positions on those issues
and to suggest an interpretive path for the Hawaii courts.
Part III addresses two problematic consequences of Federal Rule 11:
1) excessive Rule 11 litigation and heightened adversariness, and 2)
the inhibition of common law development and the discouragement of
court access. To address these problems Part III suggests that state
courts such as Hawaii's quickly adopt firm guidelines for Rule 1 1 and
embrace the concept of Rule 11 as an exceptional remedy for only
clearly inappropriate filings.
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE: AN EMPHASIS ON DETERRENCE
What are Rule lI's purposes? Three different purposes have been
espoused: deterrence, compensation and punishment. 27 Is one purpose
more important than the others? An early study revealed that many
judges tended to ascribe multiple purposes to Rule 11 and that, as a
partial result of the purpose emphasized, the sanctions selected varied
in type and severity. 28
The United States Supreme Court clarified recently that the central
purpose of federal Rule 11 is to "deter baseless filings.' '29 This deter-
rence rationale is consistent with the views of most of the federal
circuits, 0 the comments of the Advisory Committee3 and the overall
formed here into an approach of substantial caution. More problems have matefialized
than initially anticipated. See Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20.
27 Untereiner, supra note 16, at 905. (citations omitted).
28 See Kassin, An Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions (Federal Judicial Center 1985);
see also Untereiner, supra note 16, at 906.
29 Cooter & Gel v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990).
- Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1990); Thomas v. Capital
Sec. Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Pantry Queen Foods v. Lifschultz
Fast Freight, 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987); Townsend v. Holman Consulting
Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d
1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc); But see Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen
Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 934 (1988).
" The Advisory Committee's note states that "[t]he word 'sanctions' in the caption
... stresses a deterrent orientation in dealing with improper pleadings, motions, and
other papers." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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efficiency emphasis of federal procedural reforms. 32 Commentators also
generally agree that deterrence, rather than compensation or punish-
ment, should be the rule's primary goal.33 A consensus has thus
developed that the federal rule's primary purpose is to make attorneys
"stop, think and inquire" before filing, not to shift litigation expenses
from winner to loser, and not to inflict punishment. Of course, a
sanction in the form of attorneys' fees may be compensatory in effect,
and any sanction will be viewed as a form of punishment of the rule
violator. Compensation and punishment, however, are now viewed in
federal courts as incidents to sanctions imposed to make attorneys think
and inquire before filing.
To achieve its purpose the federal rule was amended in 1983 to
create a sharp "disincentive for careless or abusive filings." '34 The
Advisory Committee commented then that the rule's new objective
reasonableness standard for defining frivolousness "is more stringent
than the original good faith formula and thus it is expected that a
greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation." ' 35 There is no
longer a "pure heart, empty head" excuse for misfilings.
3 6
The rule change attempted to address a multitude of apparent
litigation sins. The connecting thread among those sins: the use of
tenuously grounded filings to gain a strategic litigation advantage. This
encompassed a plaintiff's filing of a completely meritless complaint to
generate nuisance value as well as a powerful defendant's blitzkrieg of
unnecessary motions and discovery filings to overwhelm a plaintiff (and
plaintiff's attorney) possessing limited resources.
The rule change also emphasized attorneys' dual loyalties-as zealous
advocates on behalf of clients and as officers of the court in pursuit of
justice.3 7 By clarifying attorneys' loyalties and by focusing on attorney
32 See Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 4; Tobias supra note 12; Yamamoto,
Case Management, supra note 20.
"1 For commentators in accord, see Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4, at 1020;
Vairo, supra note 6, at 203; LaFrance, supra note 7, at 351; Untereiner, supra note
16, at 904; and Nelken, Chancellor, supra note 16, at 399.
4 Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 432. For a discussion of the history
of amended federal Rule 11, see id. at 428-31.
11 Id. at 432.
36 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986).
37 See Unanue-Casal v. Unanue-Casal, 898 F.2d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1990)("While
[a lawyer] must provide 'zealous advocacy' for his client's cause, we encourage this
only as a means of achieving the court's ultimate goal, which is finding the truth")(elipses
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conduct, the rulemakers hoped to employ Rule 11 along with other
amended rules to achieve the larger goal of improved systemic effi-
ciency.m
II. TECHNICAL ISSUES
The text of Rule 11 raises three "interconnected and interpretive
issues." Specifically, 1) What conduct is sanctionable? 2) Who should
be sanctioned? 3) Wich type of sanction is appropriate.3 9 These primary
issues, referred to here as "technical issues," will be addressed in turn
along with other subsidiary Rule 11 issues concerning the timing of
sanction motions, due process, the standard of appellate review, friv-
olous appeals, voluntary dismissals, malpractice and removal.
A. Sanctionable Conduct
Rule 11 scrutiny is triggered when an attorney or party signs and
files a "pleading, motion or other paper.''40 Under amended Rule 11:
in original); Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1131 (5th Cir.
1987)(' 'while enthusiasm and innovation in advocacy, are to be encouraged, an attorney
is under a correlative obligation to conduct himself in a manner consistent with the
proper functioning of the judicial system"); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank,
N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989)(en banc)("The legal system creates duties to
one's adversary and to the legal system .... The duty to the legal system . . . is to
avoid clogging the courts with paper that wastes judicial time and thus defers the
dispositions of other cases or, by leaving judges less time to resolve each case, increases
the rate of error.").
- Rule 11 is now to be viewed as part of the "general effort by the courts and
Congress to address delay and expense in civil proceedings caused by various inap-
propriate litigation tactics." Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829, n.5
(9th Cir. 1986). Federal Rules 16 and 26 were also amended in 1983 to address
problems of delay and excessive cost. Id. Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1),
26(f) and 26(g) were amended in 1990 along with Rule 11 to conform to the amended
federal rules.
19 Untereiner, supra note 16, at 905.
10 The term "other paper" is not one that will generally cause confusion in applying
Rule 11. However, what constitutes an "other paper" merits some attention simply
because Rule 11 was not meant to govern every aspect of a litigation. The Ninth
Circuit attempted to clarify the scope of papers governed by Rule 11 in Zaldivar, 780
F.2d at 830, by discussing when Rule 11 should not apply. The Court noted that
Rule 11 is not "properly used to sanction the inappropriate filing of papers where
other rules more directly apply." For example, Rule 26(g) is the appropriate vehicle
to sanction abusive discovery requests and Rule 56(g) deals with affidavits for motions
for summary judgment. The court cautioned that "[tjo apply Rule 11 literally to all
papers filed in the case, including those which are the subject of special rules, would
risk the denial of the protection afforded by those special rules."
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The signature of the attorney constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to the best
of the signer's knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 41
By signing a pleading, motion, or other paper, the attorney or party
certifies two things: 1) she has conducted reasonable inquiry and deter-
mined that the filing is well grounded in fact and warranted by
prevailing law or a plausible argument for change in law (sometimes
referred to as the "frivolousness" clause of the rule); and 2) the filing
is not filed for a purpose that is "improper" (sometimes referred to
as the "improper purpose" clause of the nile).4 2
The key to sanctionable conduct under Rule 11 is thus the "frivo-
lousness" and "improper purpose" certification requirements. 4 The
attorney or party who signed the filing is sanctionable if she signed
the filing in violation of either certification requirement." In Zaldivar
v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit observed that since Rule 11
provides that a filing must be "well grounded in fact and. . . warranted
by existing law . . . and [must not be] interposed for any improper
purpose," the two clauses operate independently and the violation of
either constitutes a violation of the rule.45
The initial inquiry, therefore, is what conduct violates the "frivo-
lousness" or the "improper purpose" clauses of the rule.
1. What conduct violates the 'ftivolousness" clause?
An attorney or party violates the frivolousness clause if she fails to
inquire reasonably into the factual and legal bases of a filing. By filing,
*' FED. R. Civ. P. 11. (emphasis added).
42 See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986).
41 Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987) ("the key to rule 11 lies in the certification flowing from the signature to
a pleading, motion, or other paper in a law suit .... [Rjule 11 . .. deals with the
signing of particular papers in violation of the implicit certification invoked by the
signature"). Accord Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 604 (1st
Cir. 1988); United Energy Owners v. United Energy Management, 837 F.2d 356,
365 (9th Cir. 1988).
44 Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832. See also Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808
F.2d 1119, 1130 (5th Cir. 1987).
41 Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832.
46We use "frivolousness" as a shorthand reference. Rule 11 does not use the word
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she certifies that she has conducted a reasonable inquiry and that the
filing is "well-grounded in fact" and is "warranted by law" or a
plausible argument for change in law. The following is a brief concep-
tual sketch of the separate aspects of the frivolousness clause. It builds
upon, often quoting from, the more detailed 1987 article.4 7 Other
recent articles and studies provide additional depth and guidance.4
a. Reasonable inquiry
Rule 11 imposes an affirmative duty to reasonably investigate the
basis of a claim, defense or motion before filing. Judicial inquiry on a
Rule 11 motion focuses initially on what investigative steps the attorney
took before certifying the filing. Whether the investigation was "rea-
sonable" depends on the circumstances of each situation. Relevant
factors include:
[H]ow much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether
[slhe had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying
the pleading, motion, or other paper, whether the pleading, motion or
other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether [s]he
depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar. 9
The level and type of experience and the resources of the attorney
might also be pertinent 50 The reasonableness standard embodied in
Rule 11 thus is flexible. It is to be applied in a manner that accom-
frivolous. HAw. REv. STAT. S 607-14.5 (Supp. 1990) uses "frivolous" as the standard
for attorneys fees awards against parties (not attorneys). Coil v. McCarthy, No. 14105,
(Haw. Jan. 11, 1991), equates the statutory term "frivolous" with "bad faith." Id.
at 11. Bad faith was the standard embodied by Rule 11 prior to its recent amendment.
4, See Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 432-38 for a more thorough
discussion.
" See Vairo, supra note 6; Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4; Tobias supra note 12.
49 FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
50 Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 433. At least two federal courts
have identified the level and type of legal experience of counsel as a relevant factor.
See, e.g., McQueen v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 1967, No. C-1-84-1196
(S.D. Ohio, Feb. 26, 1985) (inquiry into expertise attorney may aid court in assessing
reasonableness of counsel's conduct under rule 11); Huerrig & Schromm, Inc. v.
Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (sanctions
appropriate where the two attorneys who signed the complaint had seven and twelve
years experience and held themselves as labor law specialists, thus raising strong
inference that their bringing of action was for improper purpose).
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modates the realities of law practice and should not impose unduly
onerous or unrealistic investigative burdens upon counsel. 1
b. Well-grounded in fact
For most filings, reasonable factual inquiry includes thorough dis-
cussions with the client and important witnesses 52 and a review of
available documents. 53 Rule 11 is designed to eliminate the "file first,
ask later" approach, it does not, however, require the equivalent of
substantial discovery before filing. Where a party and attorney are
unable to obtain important information through informal investigation,
they have discharged their duty of reasonable inquiry.5 4 It is the
omission or misstatement of material fact, avoidable through ordinary
investigation and analysis that is the focal point of the reasonable
factual inquiry requirement.5 5
"' How will judges actually account for the realities of law practice in the context
of Rule 11 standards? The answer touches upon several interrelated variables: the
judge's commitment to Rule 11's purposes, the judge's perception of the demands of
law practice and the judge's sense of what was fair to have asked of the particular
attorney in light of his experience and resources. Yamamoto, Case Management, supra
note 20, at 433.
52 Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1983) (personal
interviews with client and key witnesses).
13 Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Memorial Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324
(S.D. Fla. 1984).
'4 See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987)(reasonableness of plaintiff's factual inquiry must be assessed in light of the
availability of relevant information); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823
F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988)("The amount of
investigation required by Rule 11 depends both on the time available to investigate
and the probability that more investigation will turn up important evidence; the Rule
does not requirq steps that are not cost justified."); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv.,
Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)("The determination of whether a
reasonable inquiry into the facts has been made in a case will, of course, be dependent
upon the particular facts; however, the district court may consider such factors as the
time available to the signer for investigation ... [and] the feasibility of a prefiling
investigation .... "); Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 262
(E.D. Mich. 1985)("The difficulty of investigating prior to the initiation of a lawsuit
lessens the extent of investigative efforts that an attorney must undertake to satisfy
the 'reasonable inquiry' standard.").
" See S.A. Auto Lube, Inc. v. Juffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 842 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir.
1988)(sanctions affirmed on appeal for frivolous removal petition where counsel had
ample time, opportunity, and readily available sources to discover the actual corporate
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c. Warranted by law or a good faith argument for change in law
Rule lI's frivolousness clause also requires reasonable inquiry to
determine whether the filing is warranted by law or a good faith
argument for a change in the law. If a filing is either "warranted by
law" or supported by a plausible argument for change in law, the filing
is deemed legally reasonable. The attorney need not specify whether
her position is based an existing law or on an argument to change the
law. 56
(i) warranted by law
In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,57 the Ninth Circuit addressed the
standard for determining whether a pleading or motion is warranted
by law. The court noted that under Rule l's "warranted by law"
requirement, the pleader "need not be correct in [her] view of the
law.' ' She need only advance a plausible interpretation of the law.5 9
Frivolousness will be found only if "it is patently clear that a claim
has absolutely no chance of success under existing precedents."6
(ii) plausible argument for change in law
Advocacy of positions foreclosed by prevailing precedent does not
itself constitute a Rule 11 violation. "[G]ood faith argument[s] for the
citizenship of one of its co-defendant corporations); In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases,
871 F.2d 891, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1989)(motion for summary judgment not well-grounded
in fact because testimony by critical witnesses dearly created a disputed issue of
material fact); Peabody v. Maud Van Cortland Hill Schroll Trust, 892 F.2d 772, 775
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3235 (1990)(second petition for removal not
well-grounded in fact where prior petition based on same arguments was previously
rejected; Ninth Circuit stated that "[a] second presentation of the same, previously
rejected, theory to the same court fairly defines 'frivolous').
56 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
5 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 830.
Id. at 833.
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denid, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
The Seventh Circuit states that "[in most cases the amount of research into legal
questions that is 'reasonable' depends on whether the issue is central, the stakes of
the case, and related matters that influence whether further investigation is worth the
costs"). Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc).
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extension, modification, or reversal of existing law" fall squarely within
the bounds of permissible conduct. 61 This good faith standard is a
marked departure from the subjective intent standard of former Rule
11. "Good faith arguments" are to be measured objectively: Did
counsel, following reasonable inquiry, have any reasonable basis for her
arguments to change the law?62
The interpretive key is the meaning attributed to "any reasonable
basis.' '63 Some federal courts have interpreted the concept narrowly,
implying that an argument for change in law that is not likely to
succeed is unreasonable and therefore sanctionable.6 4
That interpretation tends to create problems of chilling creative
advocacy and inhibiting common law development and court access-
problems discussed more fully in Section III.
Those Rule 11 problems have compelled some commentators to urge
and other courts to adopt a much higher sanctioning threshold. 65
Counsel's legal arguments need not bear a high probability of success
so long as they are objectively defensible; that is, they have some
plausible basis in developing lines of legal or social thought.6 6 This
interpretation of "any reasonable basis" and "good faith," objectively
measured, is consistent with the Advisory Committee's stated intent.
Recognizing the importance of access for people with potentially mer-
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
62 See generally Eastway, 762 F.2d 243.
Many interpretations have emerged. One commentator asserts that this is "[blecause
judges have not been guided by a general theory for evaluating the plausibility of
legal arguments, they have depended on their own individual notions of good legal
argumentation and have produced varied and inconsistent results." Notes, Plausible
Pleadings, supra note 7, at 638.
See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); See also Notes, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 7, at 639,
citing Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13 (1984).
65 See Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 437; Note, The Dynamics of
Rule 11, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 300, 324 (1986); Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4, at
1018; Notes, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 7, at 644-51; Nelken, Chancellor, supra note
16, at 405; LaFrance, supra note 7, at 354; Untereiner, supra note 16, at 914; Tobias,
supra note 12, at 518.
See also Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274
(2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551
(11th Cir. 1987Xen banc); Operating Eng'rs v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th
Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Capital'Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988)(en bane).
66Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 437.
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itorious although unconventional claims or novel defenses, the com-
ments to the amended federal rule specifically note that Rule 11 is not
meant to "chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing
factual or legal theories ' 67
2. What conduct violates the improper purpose clause?
Rule lI's second clause prohibits filing for an improper purpose.
This certification requirement has generated conflict over appropriate
standards for judging attorney conduct.
a. Objective standard
An objective test is to be employed for evaluating whether a filing
was for an improper purpose. No inquiry need be made into the
attorney's or party's subjective state of mind. 8 Instead, courts are to
"inquire[] into whether the signer's actions under the circumstances,
as objectively measured, manifested a desire to harass or delay.6 9
The focus of inquiry is not on the actual consequences of the signer's
act or the subjective intent of the signer. It is on whether reasonable
people would agree that under the circumstances the signer "was
misusing judicial procedures as a weapon for personal or economic
harassment."70 Several of the federal circuits have adopted the objective
standard to decide improper purpose violations.71 This is the approach
we suggest for the Hawaii courts.
b. Relationship of frivolousness and improper purpose clauses
Cases from the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits collectively yield
the following guide: filings that satisfy the requirements of the frivo-
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
" In determining reasonableness according to an objective standard, a court may
consider as a relevant circumstance the signer's subjective beliefs "if such beliefs are
revealed through an admission that the signer knew that the motion or pleading was
baseless but filed nonetheless." In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 519 (4th Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
70 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986).
" See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 519 (4th Cir.
1990); Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., U.S.A., 891 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1990);
Zaldivar, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
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lousness clause are rarely sanctionable under the improper purpose
clause.7 2 Only in unusual circumstances should the filing of a pleading
or motion which is well-grounded in fact and law constitute sanctionable
conduct, even though one of the filer's motive for filing may have
been other than to advance the merits of the asserted position. Thus,
for example, the "political inspiration" for a suit "does not necessarily
mean that the action is 'improper.' '1 3
Complaints particularly are to be scrutinized with extreme caution.
[Tihe reason . .. is that the complaint is ... the vehicle through which
[plaintiff] enforces his substantive legal rights. Enforcement of those
rights [also] benefits . . . the public, since bringing meritorious lawsuits
by private individuals is one way that public policies are advanced. As
we recognized in Zaldivar, it would be counterproductive to use Rule 11
to penalize the assertion of non-frivolous substantive claims, even when
the motives for asserting those claims are not entirely pure.7 4
The Ninth Circuit has outlined two of the relatively rare situations
where "non-frivolous" filings might nevertheless be deemed sanction-
able harassment. First, the "filing of excessive motions . . . even if
each is well grounded in fact and law, may under particular circum-
stances be 'harassment' under [r]ule 11." ' 5 Second, the "filing of [an]
action in federal court, after the rejection in state court of its legal
premise" might constitute harassment "under the second prong" of
Rule 11, provided that there "exist[s] an identity of parties in the
successive claims, and a clear indication that the proposition urged in
the second claim was resolved in the earlier one.' '76
3. What is the time fame for assessing sanctionable conduct?
Whether an attorney's conduct is sanctionable is determined by the
attorney's conduct up to the time of filing. This "measuring point" is
2 See generally Westlake N. Property Owners v. Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301
(9th Cir. 1990); Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir.
1990) (en banc); Sheets v. Yamaha Motors, Corp., U.S.A., 891 F.2d 533, 538 (5th
Cir. 1990); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990).
" Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 834.
" Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140. See also Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 520 (urging courts to
"exercise special caution when evaluating a signer's purpose under Rule 11).
" Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 440.
'6 Id. The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that "[a]lthough the filing of a paper for
an improper purpose is not immunized from rule 11 sanctions simply because it is
well grounded in fact and law, only under unusual circumstances-such as filing of
excessive motions-should the filing of such a motion constitute sanctionable conduct."
Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., U.S.A., 891 F.2d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 1990).
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suggested by the language of the rule" and is consistent with the
Advisory Committee's comment that "[t]he court is expected to avoid
using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by
inquiring into what was reasonable . .. at the time the [filing] was
submitted.' '78
The certification requirements of new Rule 11 are thus tested at the
time of filing. 79 State courts such as Hawaii's are therefore encouraged
not to impose a continuing obligation to reevaluate a pleading, motion,
or other paper after filing. This position is consistent with the Advisory
Committee's comment and the rulings of federal courts generally.8 0
Imposing a continuing obligation to reevaluate would encourage Rule
1 1 motions whenever later discovery contradicts earlier stated positions.
Rule 11 does embody an indirect reevaluation requirement. Rule 1 1
requires that reasonable inquiry support each filing. 81 A party or
attorney is sanctionable for subsequent filings that continue to assert a
claim, defense or argument that has proven, through subsequent dis-
covery or investigation, to be completely meritless.
4. Must the entire filing be 'frivolous"?
Professor Yamamoto posed the following questions in 1987:
Must every allegation in a complaint (or every argument in a motion)
fail the reasonable inquiry test before rule 11 is violated? Or does an
"unreasonable" claim (or argument) in an otherwise well-grounded filing
constitute a rule 11 violation as to the unreasonable part?8 2
In his answer to these questions, Professor Yamamoto rejected the then
Ninth Circuit approach that the "entire pleading, motion, or other
1 Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. dened, 480 U.S. 918
(1987).
78 FE. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. See Yamamoto, Case Management,
supra note 20, at 437.
19 Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 437.
Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1274; Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866,
875 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Schoenberger v. Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086, 1087 (7th Cir.
1990); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Associated Contractors, 877 F.2d 938,
942 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1133 (1990).
"I Thomas, 836 F.2d at 874. See also Pantry Queen Foods v. Lifschultz Fast Freight,
809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987).
2 Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 438.
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paper must fail" before sanctions are to be imposed. 3 Instead, he
argued that even though some of the assertions in a filing met the
reasonable inquiry requirement, those that did not should be subject
to Rule 11 sanctions. 84 Yamamoto reasoned that this approach better
addressed the problem of "undue litigant and court costs arising out
of the shotgun method of litigating.'85
The Ninth Circuit has since reversed its position, as has Professor
Yamamoto.86 In Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., a majority of the
court, sitting en banc, recently overruled Murphy v. Business Cards To-
morrow, Inc.87 which advanced the "pleading as a whole" rule. The
majority held that each aspect of a filing must pass Rule 11 muster,
explaining that "[i]t would ill serve the purpose of deterrence to allow,
as does Murphy, a 'safe harbor' for improper or unwarranted allega-
tions. '"" Townsend brought the Ninth Circuit into accord with the
Second and Seventh Circuits.8 9
Judge Canby's concurring opinion in Townsend articulates a contrary
approach, one that we now suggest the state courts seriously consider.
Judge Canby opted for the "pleading as a whole" approach.94 Based
on a literal reading of the rule, which provides that the attorney signing
a document certifies that "it" is well grounded in fact and law, he
concluded that the language of the rule requires that the filing be read
in its entirety. 91 Sanctions are appropriate only if the "filing as a
whole" can be viewed as frivolous.
Judge Canby recognized that the Murphy rule was subject to abuse
by attorneys who might file one plausible claim amidst several frivolous
Id. at 438 (citing Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d
1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986)).
" Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 438-39 (citing Rodgers v.
Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985)).
8 Id. at 439.
" Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1990)(en
banc).
, 854 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1988).
Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142.
See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 918 (1987); Melrose v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 898 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir.
1990).
90 Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 1990)(en
banc)(Canby, J., joined by Pregerson, J., concurring).
9, Id. at 1146.
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ones. He nevertheless concluded that the Murphy rule constituted a
lesser evil than the majority's approach. 92
A party against whom a well-founded claim has been pleaded must, in
any event, come into court and defend against that claim. The major
goal of Rule 11, to avoid wholly unjustified litigation, has been
achieved .... It may be an inconvenience for such a defendant to have
to address other, frivolous claims, but that can be done by motion,
usually without great hardship. Often the facts will be dearer at the
time of such a motion, and if the plaintiff persists in opposing dismissal
or summary judgment when it is apparent that a claim is without
foundation, that is the time to consider sanctions. 93
Judge Canby evinced special concern about the effects of majority's
approach-that it would chill vigorous advocacy and stimulate satellite
litigation by encouraging attorneys to scrutinize every filing "to find
isolated deficiencies that may lead to a shifting of fees."94
An attorney or litigant who files a complaint with several well-founded
claims may be subjected to sanctions for tacking on an additional claim
that is determined to be not well-founded. Such a flexible rule invites
after-the-fact scrutiny of pleadings to find isolated deficiencies that may
lead to a shifting of fees .... [T]he lack of a "bright line" rule is sure
to lead to widely varying standards being applied by trial courts, and
to greatly increased satellite litigation over sanctions. 95
Judge Canby's comments are insightful, perhaps compelling. At the
same time, the majority's view is understandable-that the "pleading
as a whole" rule tolerated, and arguably even encouraged, the ineffi-
cient shotgun approach to litigation. The call is a close one. Our
suggestion is that the state courts, such as Hawaii's, follow Judge




Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 1990)(en
banc)(Canby, J., joined by Pregerson, J., concurring).
' The counter-argument can be summarized as follows. Under Rule 11, the attorney
signing certifies that she has made reasonable inquiry into her document's factual and
legal foundations. Rule 11 mandates, therefore, reasonable inquiry as to each claim
or argument asserted. The burden thereby imposed should not be undue because Rule
11 also takes into consideration various factors which define "reasonable" inquiry
under the unique circumstances of each case. Moreover, since courts are instructed to
focus on what was reasonable at the time of filing, the document "reasonably" well-
founded at the time of filing but later discovered to be meritless is insulated from
Rule 11 sanctions.
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to those reasons, the "pleading as a whole" approach is consistent
with the conception of Rule 11 as an extraordinary remedy for clear
misfilings.97 The high threshold reflected in this approach is likely to
discourage nitpicky scrutinizing of each filing and dampen potential
attorney tendencies toward commonplace use of Rule 11. It focuses
inquiry onto the prefiling conduct of the attorney in justifying the filing
as a whole. And it does not discourage the common and seemingly
appropriate practice of asserting one solidly grounded position along
with one that "pushes the envelope." '
B. Persons Sanctionable
According to Rule 11, sanctionable persons include "the attorney,
the party, or both." When should the attorney be sanctioned? The
client/party? Or both? If the attorney is sanctioned, can her firm also
be sanctioned? We start with a premise not readily apparent from the
text of Rule 11: the person responsible for the frivolous filing should
be the person sanctioned. 10°
1. The attorney, the party or both
The attorney normally is, and should be, the person sanctioned. In
most instances, the attorney prepares and signs the document filed.
When is a client/party sanctionable? Reported decisions imposing
sanctions against a client alone are rare. 10' Sanctions against a client/
party are imposed even though the client itself did not sign the
document filed.'°0 Client sanctions thus run counter to the notion that
Rule 11 imposes obligations upon the signer of the filing. This apparent
inconsistency is resolved by agency theory. 10 3 The signing attorney is
acting as an agent of the client.
9' See infra Section III.
9 See The Right Stuff (the movie). See infra Section III about Rule lI's potential for
chilling vigorous advocacy.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
00 e Untereiner, supra note 16, at 910.
,o, Vairo, supra note 6, at 227.
102 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 569-70 (1986);
Lloyd v. Schlag, 884 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1989).
103 "Even though it is the attorney's signature that violates the rule, it may be
appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose a sanction on the client."
Cross & Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1989). See
gmeraly Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (client bound by attorney's decisions
under agency theory).
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Problems arise, however, with agency theory. Client control over a
filing is usually minimal. The attorney selects the legal arguments,
sorts relevant from irrelevant facts and prepares the filing. The attorney
usually decides whether to file and what to assert. For this reason, the
Second Circuit has limited the application of agency theory. It has
held that the district courts may not sanction a client unless the party
moving for sanctions shows that the client had "actual knowledge that
filing the paper constituted wrongful conduct." 0We encourage serious
consideration of this approach. 05 Caution is thus in order whenever a
court is contemplating sanctions against a client/party.'0
1114 Cross & Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 505 (2d Cir.
1989). Relying upon a statutory prohibition against "frivolous" filings, the Hawaii
Supreme Court recently held that sanctions against a party are appropriate if the filing
is "so manifestly and palpably without merit, so as to indicate bad faith on the
[pleader's] part such that argument to the court [is] not required." Coil v. McCarthy,
No. 14105, slip op. at 11 (Haw. Jan. 11, 1991).
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has held that if sanctions against a client are
proposed, specific notice to the client must be given, because the client is probably
unaware that Rule 11 even exists. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th
Cir. 1987)(en banc).
105 The Ninth Circuit's approach differs: the circuit applies a strictly objective
standard to both attorneys and clients. Lloyd v. Schlag, 884 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1989).
Sanctions imposed on a client/party were thus affirmed on an appeal from an order
of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, even though the client
apparently made a good faith mistake regarding the law. Lloyd, 884 F.2d 409. Lloyd
involved alleged copyright infringements. However, the transfers of the copyrights
were not filed with the United States Copyright Office prior to the commencement of
the suit. The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]he fact that Lloyd himself made a good
faith error of law provides no refuge." Id. at 413.
Apparently, Lloyd's attorney did not conduct any independent research to verify
whether the copyright laws had in fact been complied with before suit was filed. The
opinion is unclear, however, as to whether Lloyd's attorney was also sanctioned for
merely relying on his client's representations. If only the client was sanctioned in
Lloyd, then this case should be viewed as an anomaly which should not be followed
by the Hawaii courts.
Again, we urge the Hawaii courts to adopt, or at least to seriously consider, the
Second Circuit's more cautious approach. It is noteworthy that the United States
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to review the appropriateness of the
objective standard as applied to clients/parties. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enter., Inc. and Michael Shipp, 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
granted, 110 S.Ct. 3235 (1990).
106 Parties sanctionable under Rule 11 also include persons who proceed pro se. The
circuits do not appear to have carved out any exception for pro se these types of
litigants. See Bryer v. Creati, 915 F.2d 1556 (1st Cir. 1990) (per curiam)(Rule 11 by
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The court should, as a preliminary matter, determine which clause
of Rule 11 has been violated and then determine responsibility for the
violation.10 7 When a filing is not warranted by law, the attorney should
generally be the person sanctioned. In these situations, the client would
not normally be in a position to judge the validity of, or to urge the
attorney to make, questionable legal arguments."'5
When, however, a filing is not well-grounded in fact, the attorney
or client, or both, can properly be sanctioned. In these situations, the
court will generally have to make a more detailed inquiry into respon-
sibility for factually unsupported filings. If a client knowingly provides
false information, then the client might properly be sanctioned. The
attorney would also be sanctionable if under the circumstances she
failed to inquire sensibly about the client's sources of information.1°9
2. The law firm
In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,110 the district court
imposed Rule 11 sanctions on an attorney and that attorney's firm
after finding that the forgery claim in plaintiff's complaint had been
insufficiently investigated by counsel.' The Supreme Court reversed
the order of sanctions as to the law firm.1 2 The Court reasoned that
sanctions against a signer's law firm conflicted with the clear language
of the rule imposing sanctions upon "the person who signed [the
paper].P ' 3
its terms applies to pro se parties); Vukadinovich v. McCarthy, 901 F.2d 1439, 1445
(7th Cir. 1990) (Rule 11 applies to anyone who signs a paper).
This treatment is consistent with the Advisory Committee Notes which state that
"[a]mended Rule 11 continues to apply to anyone who signs a pleading, motion, or
other paper." FEn. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes. However, the Advisory
Committee Notes also appropriately provide that "[although the standard is the same
for unrepresented parties . . .the court has sufficient discretion to take account of the
special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations." Id.
107 See Untereiner, supra note 16, at 914-16 (establishing guidelines for deciding
which party should be sanctioned).
,01 Id. at 914.
109 Id. at 915-16.
11 110 S.Ct. 456 (1989).
", Id. at 457.
11 Id. at 460.
" Id. at 459.
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C. Types Of Sanctions
What type of sanction is appropriate for a Rule 11 violation? This
question has vexed the rule's drafters,1 1 4 the circuit courts1 5 and
commentators. 16 The confusion is traceable initially to the text of Rule
11. The rule mandates sanctions for violations. It also, however, gives
the trial court enormous discretion to fashion an "appropriate" sanc-
tion."7
The rule provides little guidance to the trial court about what
constitutes an "appropriate" sanction. The only type of sanction
identified is "a reasonable attorney's fee. 118 Perhaps for that reason
the federal courts have tended to impose monetary sanctions." 9 The
absence of other types of sanctions in the text of Rule 11 is unfortunate.
Out of sight, out of mind may be the operative principle. Courts rarely
impose sanctions in the form of apologies, reprimands, community
service or continuing education. The federal courts' emphasis on
monetary sanctions and the sizeable amount of well-publicized awards' 20
114 The Advisory Committees's Call for Comments on Rule 11, at 4 (July 24, 1990).
Question #6 of the Call specifically addresses the "appropriateness" of the range of
sanctions imposed.
115 The sheer volume of circuit court opinions addressing the appropriateness of the
type of sanction is indicative of the confusion. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson 803 F.2d
1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918, 107 (1987); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d
505 (4th Cir. 1990); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir.
1988)(en bane); Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce in New Orleans, 841 F.2d 126
(5th Cir. 1988); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir.
1989)(en banc); Melrose v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 898 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1990);
Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986)(subsequent history omitted);
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987)(en bane).
116 See LaFrance, supra note 7; Untereiner, supra note 16; Tobias, supra note 12;
Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4; Nelken, Chancellor, supra note 16; Vairo, supra note
6; Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20.
"I Fa.. R. Civ. P. 11. "If a . . . paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose... an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." (emphasis added).
118 Id.
119 See Untereiner, supra note 16, at 911; Tobias, supra note 12, at 499.
120 In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) ($123,000); Blue v. United States
Dept. of the Army, No. 88-1364 (4th Cir. 1990)($85,000); Matter of Yagman, 796
F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986) (subsequent history omitted)($250,000); Avirgan v. Hull,
705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989)(approximately $1,000,000); Harris v. Marsh, 679
F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. N.C. 1987)($84,000).
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have exacerbated Rule lI 's potential for chilling vigorous advocacy. 121
Small firm and public interest attorneys are especially impacted. 122 The
emphasis on monetary sanctions has also encouraged some courts to
view Rule 11 as essentially a fee-shifting device. 123
The Fifth Circuit has offered an apparently productive approach to
the problem of selecting an appropriate sanction. In its en banc decision
in Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc.,124 the Fifth Circuit acknowl-
edged that attorney's fees may be the appropriate sanction in a given
case. The court observed, however, that a district court's broad dis-
cretion in choosing a sanction was designed as a "safety valve" to
reduce the pressure imposed by the rule's mandatory sanctioning
provision. 2 5 The court recognized judges' understandable favoring of
monetary sanctions in light of the rule's textual reference to attorney's
fees. 26 The court nevertheless rejected routine reliance on attorneys'
fees as "the appropriate" sanction. It emphasized that a sanction
should be fashioned in a manner that furthers the rule's purpose. Since
the rule's primary purpose is to make attorneys stop, think and
investigate before filing, and not to compensate, the court "specifically
adopt[ed] the principle that the sanction imposed should be the least
severe sanction adequate" to that purpose.127
Examples of "appropriate" non-monetary sanctions are "a warm
friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open
121 Professor Nelken argues that "[b]ecause attorney's fees have so dominated the
sanctions picture under Rule 11, and the fees awarded have often been substantial,
the chilling effect of the rule's mandatory sanctions provisions is magnified.... As
long as fees remain the sanction of choice, lawyers will ask for them; and both the
volume of sanctions litigation and its chilling effect are unlikely to decline markedly."
Nelken, Cuhancellor, supra note 16, at 399. See also Tobias, supra note 12, at 500-01.
122 See infra Section III(B)(2).
123 See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d
412, 419 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Rule 11 is a fee-shifting statute"). Professor Vairo comments
that "as the awards under Rule 11 become greater, the rule will be seen as a fee-
shifting device. As that occurs, there will be a natural increase in Rule 11 motions."
Vairo, supra note 6, at 204. According to Professor Tobias, "the willingness of attorneys
to employ Rule 11 for strategic purposes and to recoup attorney's fees has led to
excessive litigation and has created corresponding delay and waste." See Tobias, supra
note 12, at 508; Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4, at 1015-18.
124 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988)(en banc).
125 Id. at 877.
126 Id. at 878.
127 Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988)(en barc).
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court, [and] compulsory continuing legal education.' ' 2 8 As the Thomas
court noted, "[s]anctions should also be educational and rehabilitative
in character and, as such, tailored to the particular wrong. . .. [T]he
district court should carefully choose sanctions that foster the appro-
priate purpose of the rule, depending upon the parties, the violation,
and the nature of the case. ' '" We suggest that state courts seriously
consider the Fifth Circuit's approach in Thomas.
Where a fee award is deemed appropriate, the court should explain
the basis of the award so that a reviewing court may determine whether
the sanction imposed was appropriate.'3 Several factors are relevant:
1) the reasonableness of the fees sought; 31 2) the minimum sanction
necessary to deter future misconduct;1 32 3) the party/attorney's ability
to pay;13s and 4) other "factors relevant to the severity of the Rule 11
1 Id.
12 Id. at 877. This approach is also advocated by Professor Tobias. "Courts also
should levy the kind of sanctions which are the least severe necessary, keeping in mind
that there are many alternatives less onerous than attorney's fees, especially non-
monetary ones." Tobias, supra note 12, at 521. See also Vairo, supra note 6, at 204.
Professor Nelken also asserts that "[t]he Fifth Circuit's formulations of the primacy
of deterrence in choosing sanctions under Rule 11 and the importance of fashioning
the sanction chosen so that the least 'severe sanction adequate' to the violation is used
are essential to mitigating the rule's potential chilling effect." Nelken, Chancellor, supra
note 16, at 398.
I" In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990); Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d
1165, 1184 (9th Cir. 1986) (subsequent history omitted).
1 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523 (The factors in this analysis were enumerated in this
order in White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1990), and
were relied upon by the Fourth Circuit in this case.). The Ninth Circuit has stated
that "an essential part of determining the reasonableness of the award is inquiring
into the reasonableness of the claimed fees," and, thus, "[rjecovery should never
exceed those expenses and fees that were reasonably necessary to resist the offending
action." Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1185; see also Melrose v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
898 F.2d 1209, 1216 (7th Cir. 1990).
132 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523, 524 (noting that "[i]t is particularly inappropriate to
use sanctions as a means of driving certain attorneys out of practice"); Thomas o.
Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988Xen banc); White, 908 F.2d at
684-85.
"1 Professor Vairo observes that "most courts are trying to insure that the sanctions
are fair, reasonable, and bear some relation to the party or attorney's ability to pay
and responsibility for the offending litigation." Vairo, supra note 6, at 229. The Fourth
Circuit has even stated that "a monetary sanction imposed without any consideration
of ability to pay would constitute an abuse of discretion." In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d
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violation.1 13 4 In addition, where fees are sought, the moving party has
a duty to mitigate expenses. 13 5
D. Related Issues
In addition to what constitutes sanctionable conduct, who should be
sanctioned and which types of sanctions are appropriate, other technical
issues warrant at least brief discussion.
1. When should a Rule 11 motion be filed?
No set guidelines exist for determining when a sanctions motion is
to be brought. 13 6 One federal circuit has held that equitable consider-
ations are the only limits to the trial court's discretion.'3 7 Another
circuit has emphasized that the party moving for Rule 11 sanctions
must make the motion within a "reasonable time. '" 138
505, 524 (4th Cir. 1990).
The following circuits consider the party's ability to pay a proper factor in deter-
mining a fee award: Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1185 (9th Cir. 1986)
(subsequent history omitted) ("ability to pay, in our view, is a relevant factor in
determining reasonableness"); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987)("it is well within the district court's discretion
to temper the amount to be awarded against an offending attorney by a balancing
consideration of his ability to pay"); White, 908 F.2d at 685.
M Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523 (such other factors include "the offending party's
history, experience, and ability, the severity of the violation ... (and] the risk of
chilling the type of litigation involved ... "). Id. at 524-25; see also, Wite, 908 F.2d
at 685. This list is not exhaustive.
155 The duty to mitigate is actually a sub-issue of the "reasonableness" requirement
imposed when attorney's fees are sought. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits have adopted the mitigation requirement. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d
505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879
(5th Cir. 1988)(en banc); Melrose v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 898 F.2d 1209, 1216
(7th Cir. 1990); Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1185; White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d
675, 684 (10th Cir. 1990). See also Tobias, supra note 12, at 521; Vairo, supra note 6,
at 229.
156 The text of Rule 11 states only that the court shall impose sanctions on a
violating party "upon motion or upon its own initiative." FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
', Hicks v. Southern Md. Health Sys. Agency, 805 F.2d 1165, 1167 (4th Cir.
1986)("In the absence of an applicable local rule in the district court, the only time
limitation arises out of those equitable considerations that a district judge may weigh
in his discretion.").
s Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 604 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Of
course, a party should make a Rule 11 motion within a reasonable time.").
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The United States Supreme Court recently provided additional guid-
ance. It indicated that the Advisory Committee anticipated that for
pleadings the sanctions issue should generally be determined at the end
of the litigation, and that for a motion, a reasonable time after the
motion is decided. 139
According to these guidelines, an attorney should not make a Rule
11 request until the allegedly frivolous or improperly motivated filing
has been dismissed or denied. For example, a motion to dismiss a
complaint should not be accompanied by a Rule 11 request. The tag-
along Rule 11 request is premature and inappropriate. The court may
find the complaint sufficient and deny the 12(b)(6) motion, in which
case the defendant's Rule 11 request itself would be wasteful and
possibly sanctionable. 140 At a minimum, we suggest that all Rule 11
requests be raised by motion with supporting memorandum-that a
one sentence request at the end of a memorandum without citation or
argument be deemed insufficient to trigger an obligation to respond.
A variant of the guidelines offered by the Supreme Court, and one
that we suggest that state courts consider, is that all Rule 11 motions
be filed at the end of the litigation.'41 There are several potential benefits.
First, the trial/motions judge will see a complete rather than piece-
meal picture of ostensible Rule 11 activity. Second, the time involved
in briefing and hearing the motions will likely be considerably less if
the motions are consolidated rather than separately pursued. Third,
case settlements will likely obviate the need for sanction's motions in
many cases.
The principal problem with this "end of litigation" approach is that
it may in some instances distort settlement negotiations. The threat of
collective Rule 11 motions may occasionally be a strong bargaining
chip. Negotiations may be distorted because Rule 11 bargaining will
usually address an attorney's liability rather than the client's, creating a
I" Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990).
140 In concept, this type of tag-along Rule 11 motion may or may not be unreasonably
grounded in fact or law. Since the plaintiff's complaint is evaluated according to
plaintiff's conduct at the time of filing, defendant technically could file a Rule 11
motion anytime after plaintiff filed. The defendant's tag-along motion, however, is
still "unreasonable" in another sense. It wastes everyone's time and resources whenever
the underlying dispute is resolved against the defendant.
4 Note, however, that requiring Rule 11 motions to be filed at the end of litigation
does not abrogate the court's or opposing counsel's responsibility to provide reasonable
notice to the offending party that such a motion is being contemplated. See infia text
accompanying notes 142-48.
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potential conflict between attorney and client during settlement nego-
tiations with the opposing party about the client's best interests.
It is a close call, warranting careful scrutiny.
2. What process is due?
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee stated that procedure for
the imposition of sanctions must satisfy due process.142 The Advisory
Committee did not, however, specify what process is due. Instead the
committee noted:
The particular format to be followed should depend on the circumstances
of the situation and the severity of the sanction under consideration. In
many situations the judge's participation in the proceedings provides
him with full knowledge of the relevant facts and little further inquiry
will be necessary.'4 3
As might be expected the type of process due under Rule 11 varies
from circuit to circuit. Several federal circuits hold that Rule 11 does
not require a formal sanction hearing. 1"4 Even those circuits, however,
hold that due process requires that the violating party receive notice
of the motion for sanctions and an opportunity to "present opposing
argument. " 41
In addition to the notice of the motion for sanctions and an oppor-
tunity to respond, both of which are required by due process, the
Advisory Committee and some circuit courts have addressed another
type of notice. They encourage if not require notice to the Rule 11
violator of the violation before the filing of a sanctions motion, thereby
giving the violator the chance to withdraw the filing or to remedy its
142 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
14 Id.
14 Bryer v. Creati, 915 F.2d 1556 (1st Cir. 1990) (per curiamX"The rule does not
contemplate elaborate procedural requirements and does not require a hearing in every
case."); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2nd Cir. 1986), cerm. denied, 480
U.S. 107 (1987)(noting that due process must be afforded in Rule 11 cases, the court
concluded that "[t]his does not mean, necessarily, that an evidentiary hearing must
be held"); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987)(en banc)("Rule
11 does not require that a hearing separate from trial or other pretrial hearings be
held on Rule 11 charges before sanctions can be imposed.").
SBryer, 915 F.2d 1556("[wjhat is required is notice and an opportunity to present
opposing argument"); Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1560, ("The accused must be given an
opportunity to respond, orally or in writing as may be appropriate, to the invocation
of Rule 11 and to justify his or her actions.").
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defects. 46 Early notice is encouraged to eliminate the need for later
sanctions motions.
Such early notice ... will serve to warn the attorney that he risks
incurring substantial sanctions, which will in turn increase the likelihood
that meritless claims and motions will be abandoned and additional
money and judicial resources will be saved. This procedure administers
the paramount aim of deterrence and, simultaneously, eliminates the
danger of an unsuspected punitive award.
147
Early notice, in any reasonable form, 14 makes eminent sense.
3. Must the judge record findings?
Must the judge record findings if she imposes Rule sanctions? The
answer is no and yes. No, findings are not required by the language
10 The Advisory Committee Notes state explicitly that "[a] party seeking sanctions
should give notice to the court and the offending party promptly upon discovering a
basis for doing so." Notice can from the opposing party, the court, or both. FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
In Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1986) (subsequent history
omitted), the Ninth Circuit stressed the court's duty to provide early notice to a
violating party. In this particular case, the district court imposed a $250,000 sanction
against an attorney for the attorney's misconduct throughout the entire litigation
process without once providing notice that the court was contemplating sanctions. The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded stating that "in situations where a complaint
or other paper is obviously and recognizably frivolous when filed, or as circumstances
lead the court to strongly suspect that a filed paper may not be well-grounded in fact
or law, the court should at a minimum provide notice to the certifying attorney that
Rule 11 sanctions will be assessed at the end of trial if appropriate." Id. at 1183-84
(emphasis in original). See also Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1560.
14' Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1184 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Donaldson, 819 F.2d at
1560 ("An attorney or party should be given early notice that his or her conduct may
warrant Rule 11 sanctions"). See also Thomas v. Capital Sec. Sers., Inc., 836 F.2d 866,
879 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Fifth Circuit's linking of a duty to mitigate damages
with a duty to notify early the violator of the violation to allow for self-correction).
I" Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("We see no
basis for requiring that in all instances notice be in writing and with the formality of
pleadings."). See also Thomas, 836 F.2d at 880 ("In mandating prompt notice, we do
not mean to impose upon litigants a duty of notification that requires written notice
or notice through the formality of pleadings; nor do we specify a particular time frame
in which notice must be given by counsel. Notice may be in the form of a personal
conversation, an informal telephone call, [or] a letter. ... "). The Thomas opinion also
indicates that a timely Rule 11 motion would satisfy the early notice requirement.
However, for the reasons previously discussed in Section II(D)(1), supra, tag-along
Rule 11 motions should be discouraged.
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of Rule 11. Yes, the federal circuits addressing this issue implicitly
require findings as a basis for review. Those federal circuits adhere to
the view that trial judge findings are essential to appellate review. 4 9
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, for example, take the position that if
findings are not made, and the reasons for imposing or rejecting
sanctions are not apparent from the record, the case will be re-
manded. 150 Even circuits that do not specifically adopt the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits' approach to a lack of findings require a statement of
reasons "when the reason for the decision is not obvious from the
record."'15
Thus, although findings and a statement of reasons are not required
by the language of Rule 11, they are deemed necessary for appellate
review, "demonstrating that the trial court exercised its discretion in
a reasoned and principled fashion." 15 2 Findings serve additional func-
tions. "[T]hey help to assure the litigants, and incidentally the judge
as well, that the decision was the product of thoughtful deliberation;
and . . their publication enhances the deterrent effect of the ruling. "53
49 See In re Ruben 825 F.2d 977, 990-91, (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934
(1988)("A district judge faced with a sanction motion must make certain findings
determining an award is appropriate. Careful analysis and discrete findings are
required, no matter how exasperating the case.").:
For circuit court opinions not explicitly requiring findings, but nevertheless, deeming
findings essential for appellate review see Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,
823 F.2d 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Thomas v.
Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1988)(en banc); Lloyd v.
Schlag, 884 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1989)(on appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii).
&5 See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 883. As the Ninth Circuit in Townsend v. Holman
Consulting Corp. explained, "[d]istrict courts have broad fact-finding powers in this
area to which appellate courts must accord great deference. But we must know to
what we defer; when we are not certain of the district court's reasoning, or when we
cannot discern whether the district court considered the relevant factors, we must
remand." 914 F.2d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1990)(en banc).
"I See Bryer v. Creati, 915 F.2d 1556 (1st Cir. 1990) (per curiam)("In aid of
appellate review, 'we do require a statement when the reason for the decision is not
obvious from the record'); Szabo Food, 823 F.2d at 1084 ("A serious Rule 11 motion
is not a gnat to be brushed off with the back of the hand. This motion was serious;
it should have received serious attention; Canteen [the moving party] and this court
are entitled to explanations").
,52 Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 883 (5th Cir. 1988)(en
banc)(quoting Schwarzer, Rue 11 104 F.R.D. at 199 [hereinafter Schwarzer, Rue 11]).
" Thomas, 836 F.2d at 883 (quoting Schwarzer, Rue 11, supra note 152, at 199).
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We therefore encourage state courts such as Hawaii's to make
findings mandatory. Not only would this aid in appellate review and
reduce the need for remands, it would likely encourage careful and
deliberate use of the rule.
154
4. What is the standard of review on appeal?
Professor Yamamoto wrote in 1987 that appellate review has become
an important element of judicial efforts to clarify Rule 11 standards. 155
The three-tiered federal standard of review in place in 1987 16 has since
been abrogated by the Supreme Court in Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx
Corp. 57
An abuse of discretion standard is now the applicable standard of
review for all aspects of a federal district court's Rule 11 decision. 15s
Cooter proffered two main reasons for the encompassing abuse of
discretion standard of review. First, the imposition or denial of sanctions
necessarily involves fact-intensive inquiry into the circumstances of the
alleged Rule 11 violation. "[O]nly deferential review [gives] the district
court the necessary flexibility to resolve questions involving 'multifar-
ious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization." '159
Second, Rule 1l's efficiency goals support an abuse of discretion
standard.
14 Professor Vairo asserts that "requiring the district court to make findings may
lessen the arbitrary use of the rule by leading relatively zealous judges to be more
circumspect in finding violations and imposing substantial sanctions." Vairo, supra
note 6, at 224.
155 Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 441.
115 Professor Yamarnoto stated that the conceptual "standard of appellate review of
Rule 11 decisions is divided into three degrees of deference. First, de novo review is
appropriate if the dispute centers upon the legal conclusion that the uncontroverted
facts constituted a violation of rule 11. Second, if the facts relied upon by the court
are disputed on appeal, review is appropriate under rule 52(a) clearly erroneous
standard. Finally, the abuse of discretion standard is applicable to challenges to the
appropriateness of the type and extent of the sanctions." Id.
In a recent case not involving Rule 11, the Hawaii Supreme Court announced that
bad faith determinations are "mixed questions of fact and law," and that fact findings
are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Coil v. McCarthy, No.
14105, slip op. at 10 (Haw. Jan. 11, 1991). The court also stated, without explanation,
that "we review the denial of attorney's fees under the abuse of discretion standard."
Id.
157 Cooter & Gel v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990).
1-8 Id. at 2461.
119 Id. at 2460 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561-62 (1988)).
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Deference to the determination of courts on the front lines of litigation
will enhance these courts' ability to control the litigants before them.
Such deference will streamline the litigation process by freeing appellate
courts from the duty of reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts
already weighed and considered by the district court; it will also dis-
courage litigants from pursuing marginal appeals, thus reducing the
amount of satellite litigation. 160
These reasons, according to the Supreme Court, argue for broad
trial court discretion and rely upon the wisdom and front line judgment
of district court judges. It is noteworthy that the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee and various commentators are now questioning whether
too much discretion has been invested in district judges. 161
5. Does Rule 11 Apply on Appeal?
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that Rule 11 does
not authorize an appellate court to award sanctions on appeal. 162 In
Cooter, the court of appeals held that respondents were entitled to
reimbursement for attorney's fees incurred in defending against a
frivolous appeal of a sanctions award. The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court held that Rule 11 by its terms did not apply to appellate
proceedings.' 63 The Court reasoned that "Rule 11 is more sensibly
understood as permitting an award only of those expenses directly
caused by the filing, logically, those at the trial level." 64 The Court
also noted that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure placed a
natural limitation on Rule 1l's scope. 165 And limiting Rule l's ap-
160 Cooter, 110 S.Ct. at 2460.
11 Untereiner, supra note 16, at 912; see also Advisory Committee Call for Comments
on Rule 11 (July 24, 1990).
162 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990).
165 The Court stated that:
[Rule 11's] provision allowing the court to include "an order to pay to the other
... parties .. . reasonable expenses" must be interpreted in light of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which indicates that the rules only "govern the
procedure in the United States district courts." Neither the language of Rule
11 nor the Advisory Committee Note suggests that the Rule could require
payment for any activities outside the context of district court proceedings.
Id. at 2461.
164 Id.
'" On appeal, litigant conduct is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
38. The rule provides: 'If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is
frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee."' Id.
at 2461-62.
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plication to violations in the district courts served the dual policies of
not discouraging meritorious appeals and reducing satellite litigation.'6
Finally, the Court observed that risking one's Rule 11 award in the
course of defending it was "a natural concomitant of the American
Rule. 167
In contrast, and for specific reasons, the Ninth Circuit continues to
impose Rule 11 sanctions for frivolous appeals. 16 In Partington v. Gedan,
the Ninth Circuit reviewed its own earlier decision to impose Rule 11
sanctions on appeal. 169 Despite Cooter, the court affirmed its imposition
of Rule 11 sanctions for an unreasonable appeal. The court deemed
Cooter inapplicable because Cooter did not prohibit a circuit from incor-
porating Rule 11 standards into its own appellate rules. This the Ninth
Circuit had done.170 The court concluded that Rule 11 sanctions were
proper because: 1) Rule 11 was not used as an independent basis of
sanctions; and 2) the sanctions awarded were under Rule 11 only
insofar as it was incorporated into the Ninth Circuit's Rules of Court."7 '
We suggest rejection of the Ninth Circuit's approach. Incorporating
Rule 11 into appellate court rules unnecessarily extends the scope of
Rule 11 and generates a conflict with existing appellate rules. Hawaii
Appellate Rule 38, for example, already authorizes sanctions to curb
"frivolous" appeals. 172
6. Removal?
Removal from state to federal court raises three issues. First, whether
federal or state Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed when a state court
case is removed and subsequently dismissed by the federal court as
frivolous; second, whether sanctions may be imposed when a defendant
improperly removes an action; and third, whether federal Rule 11
applies when frivolous or improper papers are filed subsequent to a
proper removal."'
G66Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2462 (1990).
167 Id. at 2462.
6 See Partington v. Gedan, 914 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
1 Id. at 1349. The Supreme Court had specifically remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit in light of Cooter.
170 9TH CIR. R. 1-1.
71 914 F.2d at 1350.
12 HAw. R. App. P. 38.
,73 The structure of this sub-section is patterned after Professor Vairo's discussion.
Vairo, supra note 6, at 212.
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This first issue is well-settled. Rule 11 does not apply to cases
removed from the state courts which are subsequently dismissed by the
federal courts as frivolous. 74 In Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., the
Fourth Circuit held that a Rule 11 violation occurs at the time the
frivolous paper is "signed". "5 Where a complaint is prepared and
signed for state court proceedings, the signer is not subject to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at the time of signing.7 6 And since
later removal divested the state court of jurisdiction, the state court
cannot apply its own Rule 11 to impose sanctions after dismissal of
the case."
With respect to the second issue, federal Rule 11 does reach im-
properly removed cases. 7 8 For example, in S.A. Auto Lube Inc., v. jiffy
Lube International, Inc., the defendant petitioned for removal, wrongly
asserting diversity of citizenship. "9 The Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's denial of sanctions, finding defense counsel's pre-filing
investigation deficient. The court noted that defense counsel was not
pressed for time and did not need to rely on the representations of
two other attorneys-simple and readily available sources would have
supplied the correct information. "More was required of counsel' ' 80
prior to removal.
Finally, the law governing the third removal issue is clear: federal
Rule 11 governs papers subsequently filed in a properly removed
action. 8 1
174 See Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp. 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987); Foval v.
First Nat'l Bank of Commerce in New Orleans, 841 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1988);
Schoenberger v. Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1990); Vairo, supra note 6, at 212-
13.
175 Kirby, 811 F.2d at 257. See also Vairo, supra note 6, at 212.
176 Vairo, supra note 6, at 212 ("Because the complaint was not prepared for a
federal action, it was not 'signed' in violation of the rule, and therefore could not be
the basis for sanctions").
177 Kirby, 811 F.2d at 257. This approach creates an anomaly. If the defendant
chose not to remove the case and instead obtained dismissal by the state court, the
state Rule 11 would authorize sanctions.
17' See Unanue v. Unanue, 898 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1990); Davis v. Veslan Enters.,
765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985); S.A. Auto Lube Inc., v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 842
F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Peabody v. Maud Van Cortland Hill Schroll Trust,
892 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3216, where the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against an attorney for improperly
petitioning for removal in a Hawaii case.
179 S.A. Auto Lube, 842 F.2d. at 947-48.
11 Id. at 949.
181 See Schoenberger v. Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1990). Cf Foval v.
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7. Voluntary dismissal?
Can Rule 11 sanctions be imposed after a plaintiff voluntarily
dismisses her claim pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)? The United States
Supreme Court recently answered, yes.18 2
In Cooter, the Court's majority first decided that a voluntary dismissal
under Rule 41(a)(1) does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction
to impose Rule 11 sanctions. 83 The majority then announced that
Rules 41(a)(1) and 11 are compatible, reasoning that if litigants are
allowed to purge their Rule 11 violation by simply dismissing baseless
claims, litigants would lose incentive to 'stop, think, and investigate
more carefully before serving and filing papers."'
Justice Stevens dissented, observing that the majority's opinion "vastly
expands the contours of Rule 11, eviscerates Rule 41(a)(1), and creates
a federal common law of malicious prosecution inconsistent with the
limited mandate of the Rules Enabling Act." 8 5 Justice Stevens con-
tended that Rule 11 and Rule 41(a)(1) work in tandem1 6 and that
First Nat'l Bank of Commerce in New Orleans, 841 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir. 1988)
("Rule 11 should not countenance sanctions for pleadings filed in state court in a case
later removed to federal court unless, their deficiency having been promptly brought
to the attention of the pleader after removal, he (or she) refuses to modify them to
conform to Rule 11"). See also Vairo, supra note 6, at 213.
'12 See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990).
183 Id. at 2457.
18 The Cooter majority stated:
Rule 41(a)(1) does not codify any policy that the plaintiff's right to one free
dismissal also secures the right to file baseless papers. The filing of complaints
* . .without taking the necessary care in their preparation is a separate abuse
of the judicial system, subject to separate sanction .... Even if the careless
litigant quickly dismisses the action, the harm triggering Rule 11's concerns has
already occurred. Therefore, a litigant who violates Rule 11 merits sanctions
even after a dismissal.
Id.
185 Id. at 2463. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18 [Rule 11 and Rule 41(a)(1)] . . . should work in conjunction to prevent the
prosecution of needless and baseless lawsuits. Rule 11 requires the court to
impose an "appropriate sanction" on a litigant who wastes judicial resources
by filing a pleading that is not well grounded in fact and warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for its extension modification or reversal. Rule
41(a)(1) permits a plaintiff who decides not to continue a lawsuit to withdraw
his complaint before an answer or motion for summary judgment has been filed
and avoid further proceedings on the basis of that complaint.
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2463 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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courts are not unduly burdened by frivolous complaints subsequently
withdrawn.187 Justice Stevens concluded, "when a plaintiff has volun-
tarily dismissed a complaint pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), a collateral
proceeding to examine whether the complaint is well grounded will
stretch the matter long beyond the time in which either the plaintiff
or defendant would otherwise want to litigate the merits of the claim." 88
Finally, he predicted that the only result of the majority's holding
would be to encourage Rule 11 motions and to discourage voluntary
dismissals. 189
The majority's approach is consistent with the text of Rule 11; a
violation occurs at the time a paper is signed.'a 0 It is also likely to
serve the rule's general deterrent purpose. The majority's approach is
problematical, however, because it seems to encourage Rule 11 litiga-
tion and discourage voluntary dismissals. The majority failed to distin-
guish between complaints that are known to be meritless at the time
of filing and those that are subsequently discovered to be meritless.
This omission is likely to encourage defense counsel to file Rule 11
motions whenever a plaintiff dismisses her suit under Rule 41(a)(1).
The arguments about both approaches cut in favor and against. It
is a close call. In the context of our premise of establishing high rather
than low sanctioning thresholds wherever prudent, we suggest that
state courts seriously consider following Justice Stevens' approach and
not allow Rule 11 sanctions for complaints voluntarily dismissed under
Rule 41(a)(1).
17 The filing of a frivolous complaint which is voluntarily withdrawn imposes a
burden on the court only if the notation of an additional civil proceeding on
the court's docket sheet can be said to constitute a burden. By definition, a
voluntary dismissal under rule 41(a)(1) means that the court has not had to
consider the factual allegations of the complaint or ruled on a motion to dismiss
its legal claims.
Id. at 2464.
Justice Stevens also observed that "[iln those rare cases in which the defendant
properly incurs great cost in preparing a motion to dismiss a frivolous complaint, he
can lock in the right to file a Rule 11 motion by answering the complaint and making
his motion to dismiss in the form of a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings." Id. at 2464 n.2.
10 Id. at 2464.
9 "An interpretation that can only have the unfortunate consequences of encour-
aging the filing of sanctions motions and discouraging voluntary dismissal cannot be
a sensible interpretation of Rules. . . ." Id.
190See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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8. Is a Rule 11 violation also attorney malpractice?
Has the sanctioned attorney by definition committed legal malprac-
tice, exposing her to suit by her own client? Has the sanctioned attorney
by definition committed the tort of abuse of process, exposing her to
suit by the opposing party. The immediate response that comes to
mind is, "of course not." Yet the low threshold sanctioning approach
of the Seventh Circuit raises these issues. 19'
For example, in Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, the Seventh Circuit
observed that Rule 11 itself "defines a new form of legal malpractice"
because it "[i]n effect ... imposes a negligence standard" on the
signing attorney. 192 In another case the court stated that Rule 11
"effectively picks up the torts of abuse of process ... and malicious
prosecution.' 191 In a third case the court en bane noted that "[a]s in
tort law, the event sometimes speaks for itself. That is, Rule 11 no
less than common law recognizes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." 
Undoubtedly, this low threshold sanctioning approach of the Seventh
Circuit should be rejected. It encourages clients to sue their attorneys
and parties to sue opposing counsel. It creates unnecessary conflict in
an already highly adversarial process. The mere filing of a Rule 11
motion would place client and attorney in a conflict of interest, since
a judge's finding of the attorney's violation of Rule 11 would expose
the attorney to an automatic client malpractice action. 95
III. AVOIDING THE PITFALLS: RULE 11 As AN EXTRAORDINARY
REMEDY To BE CAUTIOUSLY EMPLOYED'"
Specific Rule 11 concerns have emerged from federal court experi-
ence. The Advisory Committee recently called for comments about the
excessive cost of Rule 11 litigation and the chilling effects of Rule 1l's
19, See Nelken, Chancellor, supra note 16, at 388. See also Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v.
Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988);
Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988); Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989Xen banc).
192 Hays, 847 F.2d at 418; accord Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 932; see also Nelken,
Chancellor, supra note 16, at 388 n.27.
19, Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1083; see Nelken, Chancellor, supra note 16, at 388 n.27.
- Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 932.
195 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 570 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
19 Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1988).
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application. 97 The purpose of this section is to describe these concerns
and to offer a conception of Rule 11 that may minimize these problems.
The concept we offer is a rule that authorizes sanctions only in
"exceptional circumstances." It is a concept now generally embraced
by the Second, Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits. If state courts such
as Hawaii's establish early and firmly that Rule 11 only addresses
dearly careless or wasteful filings, that it is not to be employed routinely
and that it is not meant to inhibit thoughtful and creative lawyering
or judicial access for the unpopular or disadvantaged, then Rule 11
may still be a valuable tool of the civil litigation judge.
A. Excessive Rule 11 Litigation And Heightened Adversariness
Responding to wide-spread complaints about excessive Rule 11 liti-
gation, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee recently issued a call
for comments about cost and benefits of Rule 11: "Has the financial
cost in satellite litigation resulting from the imposition of sanctions
perhaps exceeded the benefits resulting from any increased tendency
of lawyers to 'stop and think? '.. 11
No definitive answer is yet forthcoming. Some poignant insights,
however, may be drawn from preliminary empirical research on federal
court experience with the rule.
Statistics paint a picture of substantial Rule 11 litigation. Between
August 1, 1983 and December 15, 1987, the federal circuit courts of
appeals and federal district courts reported 688 Rule 11 decisions.?
This number is much lower than the actual Federal Rule 11 activity. 2°°
Since 1989 the federal circuit courts of appeals formally reported 294
decisions. 20 1 One recent article estimates that there have been more
than 3000 Rule 11 decisions since the rule's amendment in 1983 .202
Many more Rule 11 motions have been filed or threatened and resolved
without formal court action.
Advisory Committee's Call For Comments On Rule 11 (July 24, 1990).
Id. at 3.
"9 See Vairo, supra note 6, at 199.
"0 Judge Schwarzer notes that, aside from the reported decisions, "there are
presumably many more unreported rulings granting or denying sanctions under Rule
11." See Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4 at 1013. See also Burbank, Rule 11 in
Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Procedure 11 (1989).
20, LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir files.
See Joseph, Supreme Court Shapes Rule 11, 65 Tm/i. (Sept. 1990).
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This volume of federal cases is explainable on several grounds. Three
are prominent. First, some courts have encouraged wide-ranging use
of Rule 11 by adopting low thresholds for finding Rule 11 violations.
Second, until recently, many Rule 11 standards have been ambiguous.
Third, some courts have appeared to use Rule 11 to signal disfavor
for the substance of certain types of filings. As an apparent collective
result, Rule 11 litigation in some circuits has proliferated.20 3 In those
circuits Rule 11 might be characterized generally as a fee-shifting
mechanism rather than as an extraordinary remedy for clearly ill-
conceived or improperly motivated filings. Attorneys are there encour-
aged to wield the threat of sanctions as a new strategic litigation
weapon.
"Low thresholds," as the term is used here, describes court inter-
pretations of Rule I1's technical requirements that encourage findings
of Rule 11 violations even in situations where the filing is not clearly
il-conceived or improperly motivated and where the imposition of
sanctions runs counter to other established values. For example, some
federal courts' interpretations of Rule 1I's reasonable inquiry clause
threaten to undermine liberal notice pleading standards .2 Those courts
employ Rule 11 to demand pleading with greater specificity of fact and
with an earlier commitment to a definite legal theory than the federal
rules regime otherwise requires.20 5 Rule 11 in those situations encour-
ages a sanctions motion despite a litigant's pre-filing difficulty in
obtaining information and despite the notice pleading philosophy of
the rules.
For another example, several federal courts have adopted the position
that if any single part of a filing violates Rule 1i's reasonable inquiry
clause, sanctions are appropriate. 206 This position establishes a low
threshold for sanctions; it encourages Rule 11 litigation. As discussed
earlier, 207 if each part of each filing is subject to potential Rule 11
sanctions, then both the prevailing and losing party in every case will
be encouraged to scrutinize every filing in search of some aspect of
201 A recent LEXIS search revealed that in the last year-and-a-half the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits have reported one hundred and four appellate decisions. (LEXIS,
Genfed library, 6Cir and 7Cir files).
2" Notes, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 7, at 633.
SSee Yamamoto, Efficieny's Threat, supra note 4, at 371-72; Notes, Plausible Pleadings,
supra note 7, at 633.
206 See supra text accompanying note 87-89.
207 Id.
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any filing that might support a sanctions motion. Applying such a low
threshold would undoubtedly stimulate Rule 11 litigation.
For a third example, some courts allow Rule 11 motions to accom-
pany filings addressing the pending underlying dispute. These pre-
mature tag-along motions intensify Rule 11 activity. 2
One attractive approach to the looming problem of excessive Rule
11 litigation is for state courts to embrace the Ninth Circuit's conception
of the rule, articulated in Operating Engineers Pension Trust Co. v. A-C
Co., as an "extraordinary remedy" to be "exercised with extreme
caution' " 20-that is, to adopt high thresholds in interpreting the Rule's
frivolousness clause so that wide-ranging Rule 11 litigation and strategic
use of the rule during negotiations of the underlying claim are dis-
couraged. Rule 11 motions need not and should not be the norm.
High sanctioning thresholds reflect that policy and still authorize sanc-
tions against the attorney who fails files long after the expiration of
the statute of limitations, the attorney who files in state court asserting
less than the requisite amount in controversy, the attorney who uses a
summary judgment motion simply as a discovery tool and the party
who deceives counsel and court about critical facts.
Empirical research indicates that even high sanctioning thresholds
function to further the deterrence purpose of the rule. The Third
Circuit's year-long study of all sanctioning activity in its district courts
revealed that the circuit generally employs high sanctioning thresholds
(limiting sanctions to "exceptional" cases of frivolousness) and that
Rule 11 still has "effects on the pre-filing conduct of many attorneys
in this circuit of the sort hoped for by the rule makers. "210
High thresholds are also likely to decrease sharply the number of
sanction requests, minimizing satellite litigation. 21 1 One example of a
high threshold is the principle that the filing "as a whole" (rather than
any aspect of a filing) must fail the frivolousness standard to trigger
Rule 11 sanctions.2 12 Another example is the principle that there should
20 See supra text accompanying note 139-40.
209 Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust Co. v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th Cir.
1988).
110 Burbank, supra note 200, at 61-62.
2, The perception that sanctions requests will decrease as a result of high thresholds
is premised on the argument that once attorneys realize that only dearly careless or
wasteless filings are sanctionable, they will be less inclined to file sanctions motions.
Moreover, a sanctions motion that fails the reasonable inquiry test is itself subject to
Rule 11 sanctions. See Yanamoto, Case Management, supra note 20, at 441.
2,2 See supra text accompanying notes 90-98.
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be no continuing obligation to reevaluate the reasonableness of docu-
ments already filed. Imposing such an obligation would increase the
potential for Rule 11 litigation by encouraging parties to seek sanctions
whenever a filing turns out to be less substantially supported by fact
or law than initially anticipated. 21
3
A third example of a high threshold is an expansive definition of
"any reasonable basis" for an argument to change the law.2 14 The
value justification for these and other high thresholds is discussed in
greater depth in the next section (Chilling Access to Courts). The
interpretive suggestions in Section II regarding technical issues are
formed in part by the preference stated here for high rather than low
sanctioning thresholds.
Ambiguous standards also contribute to Rule 11 's potential to gen-
erate satellite litigation. If Rule 11 standards are unclear, litigation will
be encouraged because each party will understandably assert the view
of Rule 11 most advantageous to it. Trial court time will be required
to resolve the conflicts over standards in each case. For example, if
the courts ascribe a compensatory rather than deterrent purpose to the
rule and emphasize monetary sanctions, Rule 11 may be seen as
essentially a fee-shifting device, encouraging sanctions motions as every
prevailing party attempts to recoup its attorney's fees. 215
Similarly if ambiguity persists about whether there exists a continuing
obligation to reevaluate a filing, sanctions litigation will be encouraged
whenever subsequent discovery reveals the inadequacy of the initial
filing. The increase in Rule 11 litigation will, in turn, increase the
likelihood of appeals as the lower courts and litigants attempt to
ascertain the standards for Rule 11 application.
The statistics available suggest an overabundance of sanctions mo-
tions in certain federal courts. One apparent result is cost that exceeds
benefit. Another is that Rule 11 threats among attorneys abound,
intensifying already intense adversarial relationships. Still another result
is public perception that the bar has simply created another "cottage
industry" for lawyers. 216 Excessive Rule 11 litigation .would likely pose
a very real threat to the resources and integrity of a state's judicial
system. The questions, therefore, are whether overuse will continue in
213 See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
14 See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
216 Vairo, supra note 6, at 199.
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some federal courts and, more important, whether overuse will char-
acterize Rule 11 in state courts such as Hawaii's.
The answer to these questions appears to be yes, unless Rule 11 is
interpreted and applied in the "exceptional" manner suggested by
Operating Engineers.
B. CHILLING EFFECTS
Rule lI's asserted chilling effect has two distinct dimensions.217 First,
the rule, it is argued, inhibits vigorous and creative lawyering, thereby
stifling the development of the common law;218 and second, the rule
poses special threats to small plaintiffs' attorneys and to public interest
and pro bono attorneys, thereby inhibiting court access for certain
social groups, especially those asserting novel legal theories or reordered
social understandings in the form of legal rights.219
Judge Schwarzer questions whether federal Rule 11 has chilled
advocacy. 220 Others caution that it is either too soon to discern the
implications of available statistics or unwise to over-rely on them. 221
The data and commentary of numerous observers, however, indicate
that federal Rule 11 has to some extent chilled creative advocacy and
disproportionately affected certain types of litigants and attorneys. 222
Federal and state courts, of course, differ in many respects, and
federal question litigation may more often than state litigation navigate
through the thicket of social policy issues. State courts, nevertheless,
are being called upon increasingly to resolve such issues in the context
of environmental conflicts, wrongful job terminations, state law dis-
crimination claims, initiative and referendum challenges, tort and
insurance reforms and the like. The impact of Rule 11 on vigorous
and creative advocacy and on the accessibility of state courts is likely
to be a Rule 11 issue, if not the Rule II issue, for the 1990s.
21 See Yamamoto, Effuiency's Threat, supra note 4, at 352.
218 Id. at 351, 362; see also LaFrance, supra note 7, at 342.
2,9 Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 4, at 352; see also Tobias, supra note 12.
' Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 4, at 1017.
2' Tobias, supra note 12, at 489 ("It is too soon to discern all of the implications
of judicial enforcement for civil rights litigants and attorneys, while caution should be
exercised in relying primarily on reported decisions"); Burbank, supra note 200, at 99
(caution should be used in relying on statistics of published cases).
' See Yamamoto, Effiicy's Threat supra note 4, at 363; Tobias, supra note 12, at
489; Vairo, supra note 6, at 201; LaFrance, supra note 7, at 353; Notes, Plausible
Pleadings, supra note 7, at 631; Nlken, Chancellor, supra note 16, at 386.
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1. Chilling vigorous advocacy and development of common law
"The genius of the common law," according to Professor LaFrance,
"has been the capacity to grow and change, and litigation serves a
vital role in this process.' '223 The development of the many facets of
the doctrine of strict products liability is a classic example. LaFrance
perceives Rule 11 as interfering with "the healthy process of growth
in the law.' '224 Indeed, the Third Circuit's recent empirical study noted
that Rule 11 has "changed the role of the attorney" and that it tends
to reduce the "threshold probability that a lawyer will take a case or
pursue an argument. "225 The Federal Rules Advisory Committee was
aware of this potential problem from the outset, and it urged that Rule
11 not be applied in a manner that inhibited creative lawyering.
226
Low sanctioning thresholds, however, appear to have that inhibitory
effect. Noting that a readily imposed sanction has "implications well
beyond [the] particular matter," the Ninth Circuit in Operating Engineers
observed that such a sanction
would imply that attorneys in general should exercise little, if any,
creativity in their representation of clients, that they should not argue
for new but plausible interpretations of agreements, and that they should
not read ambiguous cases in the way most favorable to their clients. 227
The mere receipt of a Rule 11 motion by an attorney and client drives
a wedge between them. Client confidence is undermined. The motion
suggests to the client that its attorney has acted frivolously. The attorney
may respond that she was only trying to push the bounds of the law
to help the client; and the motion has simply been filed, not granted.
Doubt may nevertheless linger. At worst, has the attorney malpracticed?
At best, has the attorney exercised questionable judgment? The effect
is chilling.
To minimize Rule 1l's chill, the Ninth Circuit in Operating Angineers
restricted sanctions to the "rare and exceptional case" that is "clearly
frivolous." Rule 11, the court indicated, "must not be construed so
as to conflict with the primary duty of an attorney to represent his or
22 LaFrance, supra note 7, at 342.
224 Id.
22 Burbank, supra note 200, at 7.
216 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
227 Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir.
1988).
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her client zealously;" the law is "constantly evolving, and effective
representation sometimes compels attorneys to take the lead in that
evolution."? 28 The court drew support for its view from Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion in Talamani v. All-State Insurance Co. 229 That opinion
articulated values of court access and recognized a "strong presump-
tion" against the imposition of sanctions for invoking legal process:
Incremental changes in settled rules of law often result from litigation.
The courts provide the mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes
that might otherwise rise to attempts at self-help . . . The strong pre-
sumption is against the imposition of sanctions for invoking the processes
of the law.23
State courts have evinced similar concern. The Hawaii Supreme
Court recently acknowledged, in imposing a statutory assessment of
attorney's fees for a manifest case of frivolousness, that fee awards
"may have a chilling effect in deterring the filing of lawsuits based on
innovative theories or to modify, extend, or reverse existing law.' '231
2. Discouraging court access for "marginal" litigants
There is a second dimension to Rule 11 's apparent chill-a dimension
that also implicates values of court access. The Advisory Committee's
1990 Call For Comments on Rule 11 evinces special concern for the
Rule's disproportionate impact. The Call elicited comments on the
following question: "Is there evidence that the sanctions rules have
been administered unfairly to any particular group of lawyers or
parties?' '232
Professor Nelken's study found that plaintiffs were sanctioned four
times as often as defendants. 233 The study also revealed that although
civil rights filings comprised only 7.6% of the filings for 1983-1985,
228 Id.
- 470 U.S. 1067 (1985) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun,
JJ., concurring).
m Operating Eng'rs, 859 F.2d at 1344 (quoting Talamani, 105 S.Ct. at 1827-28).
C1" oll v. McCarthy, No. 14105, slip op. at 16 (Haw. Jan. 11, 1991). The court
also noted that potential chilling effects had to be balanced against legislative intent
to "compensate" victims of frivolous filings. Id.
2'2 Advisory Committee's Call For Comments On Rule 11, at 4 (July 24, 1990).
2" Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Gao. L.J. 1313, 1328, nn. 96-97 (1986)
[hereinafter Nelken, Sanctions].
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civil rights plaintiffs comprised 22.3% of the Rule 11 cases during that
period. 234 Professor Vairo's study similarly suggested that Rule 11 is
being used disproportionately against plaintiffs, particularly in "civil
rights, employment discrimination, securities fraud cases brought by
investors, and antitrust cases brought by small companies. "235 That
study found that 28.1% of reported Rule 11 cases involved civil rights
and employment discrimination cases. 236
The Third Circuit's recent study acknowledged that sanctions were
not routine in the circuit. It nevertheless found that Rule 11 had a
markedly disproportionate impact on plaintiffs, especially civil rights
plaintiffs.23' Civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys were sanctioned
at a "considerably higher rate" (47.1%) than other plaintiffs in other
cases (8.45 %).238
This empirical research indicates that ready use of Rule 11 has had
a disproportionate impact on federal court plaintiffs generally and on
non-mainstream claimants particularly. More frequent sanctions against
plaintiffs, the initiators of litigation, might be expected. Some judges
and commentators have concluded, however, that Rule 11 has not
been wielded neutrally, 23 9 and that federal court applications of the rule
have discriminated against certain classes of plaintiffs and attorneys. 240
In particular, sanctions are more likely to be imposed against claimants
who are perceived as socially or politically marginal and against "public
interest" attorneys or attorneys representing unpopular clients or
causes.
241
Consider a suit against the city by a Filipino immigrant, now Hawaii
resident, asserting discriminatory refusal to hire because of his foreign
accent. Lowest level clerk position in the Motor Vehicles Licensing
Division. The applicant was educated as an attorney in the Philippines
in English and had distinguished military and business careers (speaking
regularly in English) before moving to Hawaii. He finished first of 721
23U Id. at 1327.
239 Vairo, supra note 6, at 200.
236 Id.
237 Burbank, supra note 200, at 61-62, 69.
238 Id. at 69.
29 See Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 4, at 365 (quoting Judge Carter:
"'Rule 11 has not been wielded neutrally' and ... applications of the rule evince
'extraordinary substantive bias' against certain minority claims").
240 LaFrance, supra note 7, at 353 ("It is not only certain classes of cases which are
being discriminated against but also certain classes of attorneys"). (emphasis in original).
241 See Notes, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 7, at 631.
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Civil Service exam takers for the position. He rated first among short
list of eligibles. Ten minute interview. The city administrator and
secretary decided not to "recommend him because of his accent." (He
later established his communication ability by successfully performing
at a mid-level state job requiring detailed information gathering over
the phone).
Suit is based on antidiscrimination law. 24 2 Tough claim. Some un-
resolved legal questions: Is accent an attribute of race or ancestry?
Settled law cuts against applicant: Communication ability is a bona
fide job requirement and inability to communicate justifies refusal to
hire, and the employer effectively decides whether the applicant can
communicate. The applicant must argue for an extension of or change
in existing law based on reordered social understandings-that if the
best qualified applicant can communicate in English, the employer
cannot refuse employment even though the general public dislikes
hearing his accent. The majority's preference for a familiar accent is
an impermissible basis for refusal to hire.
Publicity. Interest grows. Discovery. The applicant loses at trial.
The trial judge apparently rejects discrimination theory of inappropriate
reliance on mainstream listener preference. 24 3
Should Rule 11 sanctions be imposed upon the applicant and his
attorney for filing a claim not "warranted by law" or a plausible
argument for change in the law? Should this and similar "marginal"
cases be discouraged through the use of sanctions? Some federal courts
would probably answer yes to both questions, even though sanctions
in the form of an attorneys fees award might bankrupt a struggling
public interest firm or solo practitioner. 24
Why have some federal courts embraced such a stringent approach,
adopting low sanctioning thresholds? One possible reason is efficiency-
a desire to rid the system of "wasteful" suits not based squarely on
settled legal norms. Another possible reason is political outlook-a
242 See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. S 378-2.
24' This is a modified account of Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888
F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. deied, 110 S.Ct. 1811 (1990). Fragante filed suit in
the Hawaii federal district Court alleging violations of federal antidiscrimination law.
Fragante's claims could now be brought in state court under state antidiscrimination
law. See HAw. REV. STAT. S 387 et seq. For a discussion of Fragante and Rule 11 see
Yamamoto, Efficieng's Threat, supra note 4, at 6.
244 See Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
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judicial disfavoring of challenges to established public and private
institutional authority. Professor Yamamoto has also argued elsewhere
that the seemingly harsh application of Rule 11 reflects deeply held
values about court access and the significance of the judicial forum for
people of lesser power in society who are seeking to restructure social
and political relationships245.
The choice between high and low Rule 11 sanctioning thresholds
may be characterized, in its simplest form, as a choice between
competing values of court access. We will not here repeat the arguments
for open court access other than to note that in addition to adjudicating
recognized "rights," accessible judicial forums at times have served as
part of a needed foundation for community-building, for public edu-
cation, for participation in the negotiation over social values and for
the quest for human decency. 246 Justice Stevens perhaps said it best in
Talamani:
Freedom of access to the courts is a cherished value in our democratic
society .... There is, and should be, the strongest presumption of open
access to all levels of the judicial system. Creating a risk that the
invocation of the judicial process may give rise to punitive sanctions
simply because the litigant's claim is unmeritorious could only deter the
legitimate exercise of the right to seek a peaceful redress of grievances
through judicial means. 24 7
We suggest that Rule I1 be viewed in this context by state courts
when applied to "marginal" litigants seeking reordered social under-
standings based on modified or new legal principles.2 4 Otherwise, the
Rule may well disproportionately impact upon small firms and public
interest organizations, 24 9 resulting in "over-deterrence."
245 Yamarnoto, Effciency's Threat, supra note 4, at 379 ("A value judgment is
discernible: in a system based on efficiency, plaintiffs outside society's political and
cultural mainstream asserting marginal claims are expendable. Their participation in
governmental process through litigation is of insufficient value to warrant systemic
openness.").
246 Id.
247 Talamani v. All-State Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067 (1985) (Stevens, J., joined by
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
21 See generally Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1344
(9th Cir. 1988) ("It is essential that free access to the judicial system be maintained;
Rule 11 was not intended to impede such access.").
249 Rule 11 sanctions escalate the professional and financial risk of litigating cases
that are important to bring but difficult to win. Contingent fee, reduced fee,
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It has been urged that to require a lawyer to bear the adversary's full
legal expenses through discovery and trial because of the lawyer's signing
of a pleading with inadequate pre-signing investigation could in some
cases be excessive, resulting in "over-deterrence" causing lawyers to be
reluctant to assert even marginally well-founded contentions for fear of
a sanction colossal in relation to potential benefit to the client served.250
The one million dollar sanction against the "public interest" Christic
Institute and its attorneys provides poignant illustration of the "colos-
sal" risk.2
51
We have urged the adoption of high sanctioning thresholds in
response to potential problems of disproportionate impact and over-
deterrence that so worry the Advisory Committee and commentators. 25
2
Ultimately, whether the courts choose high rather than low Rule 11
and pro bono lawyers and public interest firms are most likely to represent
minorities raising difficult issues. In so doing, they accept a financial risk. If
their clients lose, and they often will, the attorneys receive little or no compen-
sation. For a small firm or public interest law organization, the risk can be
significant. If losing, however, also means not only uncompensated time spent
but also out-of-pocket payment of defendant's attorney's fees, the risk expands
exponentially.
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 4, at 370.
250 Advisory Committee Call For Comments On Rule 11, at 4-5 (July 24, 1990).
Professor Yamamoto argues that "what has emerged among many lawyers, judges
and commentators is the perception that Rule l's disproportionate impact on civil
rights and other public interest cases dissuades attorneys and litigants from contem-
plating these types of lawsuits. Sanctions in civil rights cases are sometimes imposed
in 'very close cases' and are often imposed for plaintiffs' attorneys' assertions of novel
legal theories that courts determine to be unfounded." Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat,
supra note 4, at 363-64 nn. 107-09. See also Tobias, supra note 12, at 501. Professor
Tobias notes that "sizeable awards in even a few cases, especially those involving civil
rights, can discotrage individuals and lawyers from commencing and continuing civil
rights suits becausetheir lack of resources makes them unusually vulnerable." Id. at
501.
Similarly, Professor Nelken observes that the central controversy about Rule I 1's
mandatory sanctioning provision is the potential chilling effect that that provision has
exerted on novel or unpopular claims. She acknowledges the sensitive efforts of the
circuit courts to avoid chilling vigorous advocacy. She nevertheless found that the
"sheer size of some of the sanctions awards affirmed on appeal must concern all but
the most self-sacrificing of lawyers ... ." Nelken, Chancellor, supra note 16, at 393.
... See Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
252 Tobias, supra note 12, at 501; LaFrance, supra note 7, at 342; Yamamoto,
Efficiency's Threat, supra note 4, at 363; Nelken, Chancellor, supra note 16, at 386; Vairo,
supra note 6, at 200.
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sanctioning thresholds is likely to turn upon value judgments: that
court access should not be sharply impeded by the quest for an efficient,
streamlined litigation system; that attorney and litigant fear of creative
and vigorous advocacy should not be a price for curbs on careless
lawyering; that the legal system should not create another strategic
litigation weapon or drive a wedge between attorneys and their clients,
heightening the adversariness of an already overly adversarial process.
People's value preferences may differ and people may therefore disagree
about the appropriateness of high rather than low sanctioning thres-
holds. We have endeavored to frame the larger debate in terms of
values and practical effects to aid in the examination of Rule it's
technical aspects and its long-term appropriateness.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
We have suggested that state appellate and trial courts, such as
Hawaii's, quickly and firmly establish high rather than low sanctioning
Rule 11 thresholds. In doing so, we embraced certain values and
minimized others. Section III described our value ordering and en-
deavored to explain it in the context of problematic federal court
experiences with Rule 11 (excessive sanctioning litigation, the creation
of a new strategic litigation weapon, heightened adversariness, dispro-
portionate impact, chilling common law development and court access).
Section II examined troublesome "technical aspects" of the rule and
offered interpretive paths generally consistent with that value ordering.
Some judges, attorneys and commentators may disagree with the values
we emphasized and, therefore, the suggestions we made. We encourage
response. The symbolic and practical impact of new Rule 11 in Hawaii
courts and other state courts is likely to be far-reaching and perhaps
irreversible. We have written to stimulate debate within a meaningful
context.
That context includes developments in procedural theory that suggest
what many judges and litigators sense but what traditional legal theory
tends to ignore-that seemingly neutral procedures are not always
neutral in collective application and that rules of procedure sometimes
markedly affect the outcome of cases and the relationships of parties
and attorneys. 53 Procedure has social consequences. Rule 1 1 particu-
25 Burbank, Book Review, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MIcH. L. Rav. 1463, 1472-
74 (1987); Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 4, at 393.
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larly must be interpreted, applied and evaluated with this in mind.
Literal readings of the rule's myriad phrases, narrow citation of isolated
doctrinal statements by waffling federal courts, and strategic uses of
the rule simply to gain bargaining leverage are a-contextual approaches
to Rule 11. They assume that procedure is merely a game, a technical
nicety without social consequence. They ignore the impact of procedure
on the tenor of relationships of litigants, on the interactions of attorneys
and clients, on the availability of legal services, on the public's per-
ception of the legal system, and on the accessibility of courts as
instruments of justice.
Rule l's purpose is to make attorneys and parties "stop, think and
investigate" before filing. That is for the better. State appellate and
trial courts might best achieve that purpose, without significant adverse
side-effects, by insisting upon Operating Engineers' concept of Rule 11
as an extraordinary remedy for only clearly il-conceived or ill-motivated
filings. Consistent with that concept, we believe that attorneys need to
"stop, investigate and hesitate" before threatening or filing Rule 11
motions, lest Rule I I's promise be transformed into a destructive force.
We suggest, for example, that firms create internal Rule 11 screening
committees, of three or so experienced attorneys, to evaluate all poten-
tial uses of the rule.
Rule II's impact on state courts is likely to be felt in myriad ways.
State courts such as Hawaii's are in a particularly advantageous position
to remake federal court experience in their own image.

